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A TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE: REVISITING HARRIS V. MCRAE
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There is something drastically wrong with a concep-
tion of reproductive freedom that allows this whole-
sale exclusion of the most disadvantaged from its
reach. We need a way of rethinking the meaning of
liberty so that it protects all citizens equally.
—Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body:
Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty1
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INTRODUCTION
Anniversaries present an opportunity to look back, reflect, and
celebrate. However, on the occasion of the William & Mary Journal
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of Women & the Law ’s 20th anniversary, we think it is even more
important to look ahead to the next twenty years and imagine what
progress can be made over the coming two decades.
Specifically, the time has come to revisit the 1980 Supreme Court
decision of Harris v. McRae,2 which upheld the Hyde Amendment’s3
denial of federal funds for abortion coverage for low-income women
enrolled in the joint federal-state Medicaid program.4 Coming only
seven years after the Court issued its landmark opinion in Roe v.
Wade,5 McRae represented a sharp and immediate departure from
the Roe precedent.
By ignoring that the constitutional right to abortion means little
if a woman does not have the resources to access abortion care, the
Court effectively condoned a two-tiered system of abortion rights
that protected the affluent but allowed the government to interfere
with the reproductive decisions of the poor. In short, McRae was a be-
trayal of Roe and of the promise it offered to protect the autonomy,
equality, and dignity of all women, regardless of their income.
This is not to suggest that abortion rights are the only ingredient
needed to ensure the equality of low-income women: “While a low-
income woman may have one or two abortions in her life, she also
must deal with poor, unsafe housing, inept medical care, lack of health
insurance, pay inequities, and a host of other issues on an ongoing
basis.” 6 Nevertheless, as women’s health activist Byllye Avery has
noted, “For poor women, abortion is a matter of survival . . . .” 7
Despite the travesty of justice that McRae represented, it has cal-
cified as precedent and is now regarded by many among the bench
and the legal elite as a foregone conclusion. As recently as August of
this year, the District Court of Alabama, in what was an otherwise
excellent analysis striking down a law that sought to require abor-
tion providers to obtain admitting privileges at local hospitals, took
pains to distinguish other obstacles to abortion care from restrictions
2. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
3. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, §§ 506–07, 128 Stat.
5, 409 (2013).
4. As of 2014, individuals under age 65 with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty
line ($15,521.10 for a family of 1) are eligible for Medicaid in states that have taken up
Medicaid Expansion under the Affordable Care Act. See Non-Disabled Adults, MEDICAID
.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Population /Adults
/Non-Disabled-Adults.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PZ3T-GVQ7 (last visited Nov. 4,
2014); 2014 Poverty Guidelines, MEDICAID.GOV (2014) http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid
-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Eligibility/Downloads/2014-Federal-Poverty-level
-charts.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7V3V-2H55.
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. JAEL SILLIMAN ET AL., UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR ORGANIZE FOR
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 285 (2004).
7. Id. at 65.
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on abortion funding, citing McRae for support.8 This conventional
wisdom mirrors similar assertions by policymakers that the Hyde
Amendment is a “longstanding Federal statutory restriction” 9 and
therefore cannot or should not be changed.
But there is nothing about the McRae decision that makes it un-
touchable or unchangeable. McRae was rendered by a sharply divided
Court, with four of the nine justices issuing scathing dissents that
called out the majority decision as the retreat from Roe that it was.10
And following the McRae ruling, reproductive rights litigators and
activists aggressively and creatively sought to restore the abortion
rights of low-income women under state law.11 As a result of their
efforts, the laws of seventeen states now require abortion coverage
with state Medicaid funds.12
Moreover, the ongoing development of international human rights
law has imposed significant obligations on governments to guarantee
public health in ways that were neither discussed nor anticipated
at the time McRae was decided.13 In addition, the enactment of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) both created a new
baseline for our own government’s responsibility to ensure that people
8. Here, the court must note an error that some courts have made in their
undue-burden analyses. These courts have treated obstacles that arise from
the interactions of regulation with women’s financial constraints, as well
as other aspects of women’s circumstances, as ineligible to be “substantial
obstacles” under Casey. In so holding, the Abbott I court relied on Supreme
Court and Fifth Circuit cases which refused to find unconstitutional govern-
ments’ decisions not to subsidize abortion in a way that they subsidized other
medical procedures, including childbirth. The public-funding cases do not
show that obstacles that are aggravated by poverty are irrelevant to the
constitutional analysis. The Supreme Court in the public-funding cases dis-
tinguished between “plac[ing] obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise
of her freedom of choice” and “remov[ing] those not of its own creation.” In
cases like this one, while poverty may be relevant, the plaintiffs seek only for
government not to regulate in a way that makes it more difficult for those
poor women, that is, not to place an obstacle in the path. In the public-
funding cases, plaintiffs sought to force affirmative government action to
facilitate women’s abortions, removing the difficulties that poverty creates
generally. There is a difference between declining to interfere with a person
and refusing to assist her. The plaintiffs in this case ask only that Alabama
not interfere with their patients’ ability to obtain abortions.
Planned Parenthood Se. Inc. v. Strange, No. 2:13cv405-MHT, 2014 WL 3809403, at *26
(M.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2014) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
9. Exec. Order No. 13535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 24, 2010).
10. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 329–57 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond: Enhancing Protection for Abortion
Rights Through State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 501 (2009).
12. State Policies in Brief: State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, GUTTMACHER
INST.(Aug. 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3FM-U5CZ.
13. See discussion infra Part II.E.
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have access to affordable health care and reinvigorated a debate
about insurance coverage for abortion care that has energized a new
generation of activists to protest restrictions that deny abortion
coverage to women.
The federal precedent will never change, however, unless those
who recognize the injustices that McRae wrought fight to overturn
it. Rhonda Copelon, an attorney and international human rights ex-
pert who challenged the Hyde Amendment and litigated several other
cases that sought public supports for reproductive healthcare, wrote
of a possible future in which reproductive rights were recognized as
positive rights:
My hope for the next phase of the movement for procreative and
sexual rights is that we not limit ourselves simply to winning back
what we have lost, but rather set our sights on winning what we
need: recognition of an affirmative right of self-determination. . . .
This will [ ]require recognizing that it is society’s responsibility
both to protect [reproductive] choice and to provide the material
and social conditions that render [reproductive] choice a mean-
ingful right rather than a mere privilege.14
Outside of the legal arena, activists have undertaken a robust
effort to challenge the status quo on abortion affordability, reimagine
and create a new political reality and, as Copelon suggested, win what
we need.15 The campaign is multipronged, employing organizing,
communications, policy, and movement building strategies. While
this work focuses on abortion rights (as opposed to the other repro-
ductive health needs of low-income women, including those neces-
sary to carry a wanted pregnancy to term), it does so in a way that
recognizes the real-life implications of restrictions on access to abor-
tion care and criticizes the discriminatory nature of laws that exploit
the vulnerabilities of low-income women.
There are times when changes in the law spur cultural change.
But more often than not, the court of public opinion must change
before we are able to change the opinion of the courts.16 Now that
the reproductive health, rights, and justice movement17 has begun
14. Rhonda Copelon, Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building Sexual and
Reproductive Freedom, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 15, 16 (1990–1991).
15. See, e.g., About, ALL* ABOVE ALL, http://allaboveall.org/about/about-all-above-all/,
archived at http://perma.cc/FV2-R9W9 (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). “All* Above All unites
organizations and individuals to build support for lifting the bans that deny abortion cov-
erage. Our vision is to restore public insurance coverage so that every woman, however
much she makes, can get affordable, safe abortion care when she needs it.” Id.
16. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 336–39 (1st ed. 1991).
17. For a discussion of distinctions among reproductive rights, reproductive health, and
reproductive justice, see ASIAN COMM. FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, A NEW VISION FOR ADVANCING
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to develop the necessary infrastructure to shift culture and policy in
response to the Hyde Amendment, it is time to create a complemen-
tary vision to challenge the legal status quo on abortion coverage
and funding.
Thus, it is with the ultimate goal of overruling McRae in mind
that we have written this Article. Many may view such an effort as
a Sisyphean task, but it is not impossible. The U.S. Constitution is
a living document whose principles are broad enough to adapt to our
society’s evolving understanding of human rights, and these princi-
ples require an interpretation of its provisions that affirms the dig-
nity of all people and affords them the opportunity to achieve their
full potential.
This Article proceeds in two parts. First, we provide a brief over-
view of the history of abortion funding and coverage restrictions and
the jurisprudence surrounding them. Second, we lay out the ways in
which McRae was wrongly decided and warrants further attention
and scholarship. In doing so, we rely heavily upon the compelling
arguments of the McRae dissenters and the rich literature that has
previously explored this subject—especially in the sections that ad-
dress the level of review used by the Court and arguments related to
substantive due process and human rights law. However, we also try
to advance some novel theories, particularly with regard to the Equal
Protection Clause. Although we confined most of our arguments to
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, we would encourage scholars
to consider other sources of constitutional law as well.
By revisiting familiar theoretical territory and exploring some
new terrain, we aim to spur fresh scholarship and advocacy by emerg-
ing and established thinkers and leaders alike. As advocates, our hope
is that, by the Journal’s 40th anniversary, we can celebrate the over-
ruling of McRae and the dawn of an era that protects the rights of all
women to determine for themselves, without government coercion,
whether and when to have a child. We are excited to see what the
next twenty years bring and expect it to include genuine progress in
changing the legal culture in this country to recognize that the right
to abortion is a right in name only when it is unaffordable.
I. THE HISTORY OF ABORTION FUNDING AND COVERAGE BANS
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, recognizing
that the fundamental right to privacy includes the right to decide to
OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, AND REPRODUCTIVE
JUSTICE 2 (2005), available at http//strongfamiliesmovement.org/assets/docs/ACRJ-A-New
-Vision.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L5KY-LRGF.
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have an abortion.18 Abortion opponents wasted no time in seeking
ways to limit and undermine that right. One of the first places they
started was with the issue of abortion funding.
Within months of the Roe decision, in December 1973, its oppo-
nents introduced the Helms Amendment, which prohibits U.S. for-
eign aid from being used to fund abortion services for women abroad.19
That same year, abortion opponents attempted to restrict Medicaid
coverage for abortion care in the U.S., but that effort failed.20 In the
meantime, they managed to enact several state versions that with-
held state Medicaid funds from covering abortion care.21
Women’s rights advocates challenged two such state laws, those
of Connecticut and Pennsylvania, in cases that ultimately reached the
Supreme Court. In Maher v. Roe22 and Beal v. Doe,23 the Court held
that neither the U.S. Constitution nor the federal Medicaid statute
required states to cover nontherapeutic abortions. However, the Court
did not rule on whether a denial of funds for medically indicated abor-
tions was constitutionally or statutorily infirm because the challenged
state statutes only prohibited the use of funds for abortions that were
not “medically necessary,” 24 which was the relevant standard under
the Medicaid statute.
In 1976, the Hyde Amendment, which limited federal Medicaid
coverage of abortion care, was passed into law for the first time as a
policy rider attached to the fiscal year 1977 annual appropriations bill
that funded the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.25
18. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
19. LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL41360, ABORTION AND FAMILY
PLANNING–RELATED PROVISIONS IN U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LAW AND POLICY 3 n.7 (2014).
20. Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-Care for All: The Expansion of Abortion-Funding Restrictions
Under Health Care Reform, 15 CUNY L. REV. 391, 402 (2012).
21. Id. at 402 n.49.
22. 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977).
23. 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977).
24. In the discourse surrounding abortion care, laws and regulations often draw
distinctions between abortions that are necessary to preserve a woman’s health (i.e.,
“therapeutic,” “medically indicated,” or “medically necessary”) and those that are not (i.e.,
“nontherapeutic” or “elective”). However, as Justice Brennan noted in his Beal dissent,
pregnancy always requires medical care, no matter whether its outcome is childbirth or
abortion. Beal, 432 U.S. at 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Roe v. Norton, 408 F.
Supp. 660, 663 n.3 (Conn. 1975)).
Pregnancy is unquestionably a condition requiring medical services. . . .
Treatment for the condition may involve medical procedures for its termi-
nation, or medical procedures to bring the pregnancy to term, resulting in
a live birth. “[A]bortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral
arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply two alternative
medical methods of dealing with pregnancy . . . .”
Id.
25. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980). The Department of Health, Education
and Welfare was later split into the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Department of Education. Id. at 302 n.2.
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Abortion-rights advocates immediately obtained an injunction, which
was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court, but Congress con-
tinued to re-enact various incarnations of the Hyde Amendment in
subsequent annual appropriations measures or joint resolutions.26
After the Supreme Court decided Maher and Beal, the Court
vacated the preliminary injunction against the Hyde Amendment
and remanded the case for further consideration.27 After a long trial,
the district court found that all versions of the Hyde Amendment
were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process
components of the Fifth Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment.28
The initial measure as passed was a complete ban on abortion
coverage in the Medicaid program. However, legislators later added
an exception—allowing for abortion when a pregnancy endangers a
woman’s life—in conference to end a months-long impasse between
the House and Senate over the amendment.29 The version that ap-
plied for most of the 1978 fiscal year and all of the 1979 fiscal year
also included exceptions for abortions where a pregnancy resulted
from rape or incest, as well as in “instances where severe and long-
lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the preg-
nancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians.”30
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the version that was
in effect (for fiscal year 1980) included exceptions for life-endangering
pregnancies and those caused by rape or incest,31 but not those that
threatened the health of the woman.32
26. Id. at 302–04.
27. Id. at 304.
28. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 736–42 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
29. Julie Rovner, Abortion Funding Ban Has Evolved Over the Years, NPR (Dec. 14,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121402281, archived at http://
perma.cc/FZQ7-SY5R.
30. Califano, 491 F. Supp. at 642 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 662, 95th Cong. § 101 (1977)).
31. The specific reporting requirements in order to qualify for the rape or incest ex-
ception to abortion funding vary from state to state. See Dylan Matthews, How Do Rape
Exceptions Work?, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/wonkblog/wp/2012/08/21/howdo-rape-exceptions-work/, archived at http://perma.cc/N46E
-4TDN. In Iowa, women must submit a police report of the rape within 45 days of the
crime’s occurrence and attach the report to their Medicaid claim in order to get funding
for an abortion. See id.; see also Amanda Dennis & Kelly Blanchard, A Mystery Caller
Evaluation of Medicaid Staff Responses about State Coverage of Abortion Care, 22
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e143, e145 (2012) http://www.whijournal.com/article/S1049-3867
(11)00251-9/pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/84ZQ-USCW (finding that Medicaid staff often
provided inconsistent information in order to discourage women from seeking abortion
coverage, including false information about coverage for pregnancies resulting from rape
and incest).
32. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1980). Those same three exceptions (life,
rape, and incest) are also in effect today.
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Despite some indications in Maher and Beal that a denial of funds
for medically necessary abortions might be fatal to the measure, the
Court relied heavily on the reasoning of those cases to uphold the
Hyde Amendment in McRae, even in the absence of a health exception.
Drawing an arguably artificial distinction between “direct state inter-
ference with a protected activity” and “state encouragement of an al-
ternative activity,” the Court found that the legislation created no
new obstacle to accessing abortion care and that there was no con-
stitutional obligation to “subsidize abortions.” 33 In sum, in the view
of the five-Justice McRae majority, it was the woman’s poverty, not
the denial of Medicaid coverage for abortion care, that interfered with
her ability to get an abortion: “The financial constraints that restrict
an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally
protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental re-
strictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.” 34
In response to the McRae decision, beginning in the early 1980s,
abortion-rights advocates sought to expand Medicaid coverage for
abortion at the state level.35 They did so for the most part by challeng-
ing state policies that prohibited Medicaid coverage for medically nec-
essary abortions while fully covering prenatal care and childbirth.36
Challenges to these state restrictions were largely successful, with the
majority of the courts in these suits finding the Medicaid restric-
tions to be invalid under state constitutional guarantees.37 Today,
whether pursuant to statute or court order, the law in seventeen
states requires the use of state Medicaid funds to cover abortion care
in most or all cases that are “medically necessary.” 38 In addition,
Indiana, Utah, and Wisconsin provide state coverage for abortions
deemed “necessary to prevent grave, long-lasting damage to the
woman’s physical health,” and Iowa, Mississippi, and Virginia cover
abortions in the case of fetal anomaly.39 Outside of these states,
however, women enrolled in Medicaid are still bound by the McRae
33. Id. at 314–15.
34. Id. at 316.
35. Wharton, supra note 11, at 501.
36. Id. at 501–02.
37. Id. at 501–02, 502 n.189.
38. State Policies in Brief: State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, supra note 12.
The seventeen states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia. Id. It should be noted, however, that of
those seventeen states, two are not in compliance with court orders requiring Medicaid
coverage of abortion care. See JESSICA ARONS & MADINA AGÉNOR, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND WOMEN OF COLOR 7 (2010), available
at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/12/pdf/hyde_amendment
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7BS3-3TN2.
39. State Policies in Brief: State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, supra note 12.
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decision and the Hyde Amendment and are therefore denied coverage
for abortion care beyond cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest.
In the wake of McRae, the number of abortions covered by fed-
eral Medicaid funds dropped 1000-fold.40 In 1977, Medicaid covered
nearly 300,000 procedures; in 1992, it covered fewer than 300.41
Restrictions on abortion funding and coverage in other federal health
programs and plans have since proliferated.42 Today, coverage for
abortion care in most circumstances is denied not only to women en-
rolled in Medicaid, but also to disabled women in Medicare, adoles-
cents in the Children’s Health Insurance Program, military personnel
and dependents, veterans, federal civilian employees and their depen-
dents, Peace Corps volunteers, Native Americans aided by the Indian
Health Service, District of Columbia residents, and women in federal
prisons and detention centers.43
In 2010, the Hyde policy barring federal funding of abortion cover-
age was applied to the private insurance market with the passage of
the ACA.44 Under the ACA, health insurers that cover abortion care
in their plans must segregate tax credits and other federal subsidies
from private premiums and use only the latter to pay for coverage of
abortion care.45 The ACA also permits states to ban abortion coverage
in private health plans sold in their insurance marketplaces.46 Thus
far, twenty-five states have taken up the invitation to do so.47
Consequently, over time, opponents of abortion rights have cast
ever-wider nets to draw more people into the untenable position of
needing to terminate a pregnancy but lacking the insurance coverage
or financial resources to do so:
With attacks on abortion funding, abortion opponents have pa-
tiently pursued an incremental approach to eroding abortion rights
and access that affects wider swaths of women each time. But
they started doing so with the most vulnerable and marginalized
40. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 231.
41. Id.
42. ARONS & AGÉNOR, supra note 38, at 7–9.
43. Id.; Heather D. Boonstra, Insurance Coverage of Abortion: Beyond the Exceptions for
Life Endangerment, Rape and Incest, 16 GUTTMACHER POL. REV. 2, 4 (2013); see also U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION
STANDARDS 307 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JA7D-VKFN (outlining restrictions on abortion care in
detention centers); 32 C.F.R. § 199.4(e)(1)–(2) (2014) (outlining restrictions on abortion care
in the military); 38 C.F.R. § 17.38(c)(1) (2014) (providing no abortion care or counseling by
the Veteran’s Administration under any circumstances).
44. Boonstra, supra note 43, at 4–5.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(b)(1)–(2) (2014).
46. Id. § 18023(a)(1).
47. State Policies in Brief: Restricting Insurance Coverage of Abortion, supra note 12.
14 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:005
groups of women in our society. It is on their bodies that abortion
funding policy has been forged, and they are the ones who pay the
harshest prices.48
II. THE CASE FOR REVISITING HARRIS V. MCRAE
In this section, we offer several reasons why McRae was wrongly
decided under the precedent of the time and attempt to develop some
new theories that might spark further scholarship: namely, that the
Hyde Amendment violates the government’s obligation to remain neu-
tral in distributing benefits, uses government funds to coerce a con-
stitutionally protected decision, and unconstitutionally conditions
government benefits on the abrogation of a constitutional right; that
the Court used the wrong (lower) level of review given that the right
to decide to have an abortion has been recognized as fundamental;
that the Court failed to consider the liberty interest of a right to health
at issue in McRae; that the Hyde Amendment violates the equal pro-
tection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution because women
seeking an abortion should be afforded the protections of a suspect
class, laws showing animus against women seeking an abortion should
fail even rational review, and abortion coverage and funding bans
have a disparate impact on low-income women of color; and that the
Hyde Amendment and similar policies violate human rights norms.
A. Government Treatment of Benefits
1. Government Neutrality
The principle of government neutrality provides that with respect
to constitutional rights, the government may not place its thumb on
the scale in the exercise of those rights. Thus, it cannot exclude speech
it disfavors from public facilities,49 it cannot offer rides to the polls for
members of one political party but not the other,50 and—when the
standard is applied appropriately—the government cannot fund child-
birth over abortion.
As Justice Stevens explained in his dissent in McRae: “The fed-
eral sovereign . . . must govern impartially. . . . [W]hen the sovereign
provides a special benefit or a special protection for a class of persons,
48. ARONS & AGÉNOR, supra note 38, at 5.
49. Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1151,
1165 (1993) (citing Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 787–89 (Cal.
1981)).
50. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 336 n.6 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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it must define the membership in the class by neutral criteria, it
may not make special exceptions for reasons that are constitution-
ally insufficient.” 51
The Court contradicted the neutrality principle when holding in
Maher, and reaffirming in McRae, that the state may make “a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion. . . .” 52 This holding in par-
ticular belied the fact that the McRae Court did not genuinely view
the abortion right as fundamental.
In this retreat from Roe, the Court expressed fear of the slippery
slope.53 Justice Stewart, the author of the majority opinion, worried
that the plaintiffs’ logic in McRae would result in a governmental
obligation to fund abortion even if it did not fund other pregnancy-
related care.54
To translate the limitation on governmental power [to interfere
with the abortion decision] implicit in the Due Process Clause into
an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to sub-
sidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman
even if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsi-
dize other medically necessary services.55
However, what Stewart missed in his analysis is that Congress
did choose to subsidize other medically necessary care for pregnant
and non-pregnant people alike and that it cut off coverage for abor-
tion care precisely in order to further the state’s interest in protecting
potential human life—i.e., in order to discourage poor women from
exercising their fundamental right to choose abortion.56 Under those
circumstances, the government most certainly violated its obligation
to maintain neutrality toward a fundamental right.57
The majority in Maher, on which the McRae decision relied
heavily, did acknowledge that there are constitutional limits to the
government’s policy choices:
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay the
pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed
to pay any of the medical expenses of the indigent. But when a
51. Id. at 349 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
53. Id. at 316.
54. Indeed, under human rights law, other countries have found an independent
affirmative obligation to ensure affordable access to abortion care. See discussion infra
Part II.E.
55. McRae, 448 U.S. at 318.
56. Id. at 336 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 356–57.
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State decides to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by pro-
viding medical care, the manner in which it dispenses benefits
is subject to constitutional limitations.58
Unfortunately, the Maher Court determined those limitations did
not apply because there was no “discrimination against a suspect
class” 59 and there was no obstacle “in the pregnant woman’s path to
an abortion.” 60 Thus, the state was free to make a policy choice to
“finance certain childbirth expenses.” 61
From time to time, every state legislature determines that, as a
matter of sound public policy, the government ought to provide
certain health and social services to its citizens . . . . The decision
to provide any one of these services—or not to provide them—is
not required by the Federal Constitution. Nor does the providing
of a particular service require, as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, the provision of another.62
Justice Stevens, however, took on this reasoning as faulty in his
McRae dissent: “Having decided to alleviate some of the hardships
of poverty by providing necessary medical care, the government must
use neutral criteria in distributing benefits.” 63 He went on to explain
that just as the government may not deny benefits to someone because
of her political affiliation, her religion, her race, or her speaking out
in opposition to a government program, it may not deny a person
benefits because she chooses to exercise her right to an abortion.64
Several of the state courts that have struck down bans on state
Medicaid coverage of abortion under their own constitutions have
done so on the grounds that the bans violate the neutrality principle.65
Perhaps the Massachusetts Supreme Court summarized it best when
it said:
As an initial matter, the Legislature need not subsidize any of the
costs associated with child bearing, or with health care generally.
However, once it chooses to enter the constitutionally protected
area of [reproductive] choice, it must do so with genuine indiffer-
ence. It may not weigh the options open to the pregnant woman
58. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–70 (1977).
59. Id. at 470.
60. Id. at 474.
61. Id. at 481 (Burger, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 464 (majority opinion).
63. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 356 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. See Kolbert & Gans, supra note 49, at 1163–66; Soohoo, supra note 20, at 436–38;
Wharton, supra note 11, at 505.
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by its allocation of public funds; in this area, government is
not free to “achieve with carrots what [it] is forbidden to achieve
with sticks.” 66
Like Massachusetts, many state courts, including those of Alaska,
California, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, and
West Virginia, have used the neutrality framework to strike down
their states’ laws that cover pregnancy and childbirth while denying
coverage for abortion.67 Utilizing language similar to that quoted by
the Massachusetts court, these courts agreed that when a state gov-
ernment chooses to dispense funds, it must do so in a nondiscrimina-
tory fashion.68 As the New Jersey Supreme Court succinctly stated, it
is simply “not neutral to fund services medically necessary for child-
birth while refusing to fund medically necessary abortions.” 69
In his dissent in Beal, the companion case to Maher, Justice
Brennan delineated some of the real-life consequences of the Court’s
decision: “The Court’s construction can only result as a practical
matter in forcing penniless women to have children they would not
have borne if the State had not weighted the scales to make their
choice to have abortions substantially more onerous.” 70 A reverse
policy—that made carrying to term substantially more difficult and
abortion a much more feasible option—would be just as offensive to
the Constitution.
Under the principle of government neutrality, it is equally intoler-
able when the government places its thumb on the scale of reproduc-
tive decision making in either direction. “The government, whether
through burdensome regulation or through inaction in the face of
66. Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 402 (Mass. 1981) (quoting
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 n.77 (1978)).
67. State Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Ala., 28 P.3d 904, 915
(Alaska 2001); Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Meyers, 625 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal. 1981);
Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 33 (Minn. 1995) (Coyne, J., dissenting); Right
to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1982); Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va. v.
Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 666 (W. Va. 1993); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 151–52
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home: State Constitutions and
Medicaid Funding for Abortions, 26 N.M. L. REV. 433, 452 (1996) (citing N.M. Right to
Choose/NARAL v. Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C) (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 3, 1995)).
68. See Planned Parenthood of Ala., 28 P.3d at 915 (Alaska 2001); Comm. to Defend
Reprod. Rights v. Meyers, 625 P.2d at 784 (Cal. 1981); Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542
N.W.2d at 33 (Minn. 1995) (Coyne, J., dissenting); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d
at 935 (N.J. 1982); Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d at 666 (W.
Va. 1993);Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d at 151–52 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Vanzi, supra note 67,
at 452 (1996) (citing N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Danfelser, No. SF 95-867(C) (N.M.
Dist. Ct. July 3, 1995)).
69. Byrne, 450 A.2d at 935.
70. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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need, should not compel a woman to have either an abortion or a
child against her will.” 71
2. Government Coercion
Any coercion by the government infringing on the people’s pro-
tected liberties ought to sound warning sirens for the ultimate arbiters
of the Constitution. Their suspicions, along with their scrutiny, should
heighten when that coercion is levied against a person or group of
people least able to withstand or overcome it, due to economic con-
straints, political powerlessness, social stigma, or disenfranchisement.
The McRae ruling allowed the government to use the Hyde Amend-
ment to coerce the constitutionally protected procreative choices of
poor women, who are disproportionately young and of color,72 knowing
their vulnerabilities often render their resistance futile.73
For the time being, a majority in Congress has adopted the view
that childbirth is a greater public good than abortion74 and has de-
cided to use the Medicaid program as a means to promote and incen-
tivize its favored pregnancy outcome while discouraging and, as a
practical matter in many instances, preventing the disfavored out-
come. Thus, under the Hyde Amendment, Medicaid covers prenatal,
labor and delivery, and postpartum care, as well as miscarriage man-
agement when necessary—in other words, all costs associated with
pregnancy except for abortion.75 Any Medicaid-eligible person with
this particular health condition—pregnancy—has a “choice” between
a treatment that is fully covered by insurance on the one hand and
a treatment that must be paid fully out-of-pocket on the other.
The Court explained that Congress has merely encouraged an al-
ternative activity (childbearing) deemed in the public interest and has
not directly interfered with a protected activity (abortion).76 “Consti-
tutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its
71. Jessica Arons, More than a Choice: A Progressive Vision for Reproductive Health
and Rights, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 19 (Sept. 13, 2006) http://cdn.americanprogress.org
/wp-content/uploads/issues/2006/09/more_than_a_choice.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/Z22L-U4UQ.
72. See Jessica Arons & Lindsay Rosenthal, How the Hyde Amendment Discriminates
against Poor Women and Women of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (May 10, 2013),
http://americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2013/05/10/62875/how-the-hyde
-amendment-discriminates-against-poor-women-and-women-of-color, archived at http://
perma.cc/9LP3-B3VP.
73. See Kenneth Agran, When Government Must Pay: Compensating Rights and the
Constitution, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 100 (2005) (describing a constitutional framework
mandating governmental assistance to realize the full promise of constitutional rights).
74. The majority acknowledges as much in deferring to Congress’s “policy choice.”
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 333–34.
76. Id. at 325 (majority opinion).
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will by force of law; the State’s power to encourage actions deemed to
be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.” 77
The Court effectively stated that the full funding of one pregnancy
option over the other has no impact on a poor woman’s “choice.” “[T]he
Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the same
range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary
abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize
no health care costs at all.” 78
In Roe, however, the Court articulated a constitutionally pro-
tected right to privacy that encompassed the choice to terminate a
pregnancy—a decision that is to be made free from government in-
terference.79 Both the majority opinion and the dissents in McRae
recognized this critical aspect of Roe’s holding.80 As Justice Brennan
wrote in his dissent, Roe and its progeny stand for the proposition
“that the State must refrain from wielding its enormous power and
influence in a manner that might burden the pregnant woman’s free-
dom to choose whether to have an abortion.” 81
Policy that makes either pregnancy option more attractive or
available interferes in the decision-making process. Given that the
affected population is, by virtue of qualifying for the program, severely
poor, it is reasonable to surmise that the coverage disparity would, at
a minimum, factor into a person’s decision—simultaneously encourag-
ing pregnancy and discouraging abortion.82 Yet the opinion in McRae
ignored how a disparate funding scheme casts a shadow on the abor-
tion decision, mentioning only how it shines a light on pregnancy
and birth.83
77. Id. at 314–15 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475–76 (1977)).
78. Id. at 298. Given that the ACA relies on the government providing tax credits and
other subsidies to offset premiums for private insurance plans as the primary means of
achieving the goal of universal health coverage, the implications of the Court’s reasoning
are far reaching. Indeed, it is what the proponents of the Stupak Amendment, H.R. 3962,
111th Cong. § 265 (as passed by House, Nov. 7, 2009), were hoping would enable them to
use health reform as a vehicle to effectively ban abortion coverage in private health plans.
See Jessica Arons, Why The Stupak Amendment Is a Monumental Setback For Abortion
Access, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 9, 2009, 10:45 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2009
/11/09/171044/stupak-amendment-jessica/, archived at http://perma.cc/CE5B-LUFQ.
79. McRae, 448 U.S. at 329–30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. “The doctrine of Roe v. Wade, the Court held in Maher, ‘protects the woman from
unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy’ . . . .” Id. at 314 (majority opinion).
81. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 333–34.
83. It follows that the Hyde Amendment, by encouraging childbirth except in the
most urgent circumstances, is rationally related to the legitimate governmen-
tal objective of protecting potential life. By subsidizing the medical expenses
of indigent women who carry their pregnancies to term while not subsidizing
the comparable expenses of women who undergo abortions (except those
whose lives are threatened), Congress has established incentives that make
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The Hyde Amendment, however, may in some cases do far more
than simply factor into a poor person’s decision about an unwanted
pregnancy; it may be dispositive. In such instances, the government
reaches beyond mere influence in the woman’s decision-making pro-
cess to commandeer it. Justice Brennan describes how the financial
incentive is so overbearingly powerful that it can make the abortion
decision illusory:
[T]he reality of the situation is that the Hyde Amendment has
effectively removed this choice from the indigent woman’s hands.
By funding all of the expenses associated with childbirth and
none of the expenses incurred in terminating pregnancy, the
Government literally makes an offer that the indigent woman
cannot afford to refuse.84
As Justice Brennan points out, it is this very intrusion into the
decision-making process that renders the Hyde Amendment uncon-
stitutional.85 “By thus injecting coercive financial incentives favor-
ing childbirth into a decision that is constitutionally guaranteed to
be free from governmental intrusion, the Hyde Amendment deprives
the indigent woman of her freedom to choose abortion over maternity,
thereby impinging on the due process liberty right recognized in Roe
v. Wade.” 86
Of the thirteen state courts that have struck down abortion fund-
ing restrictions, nearly all have recognized the coercive effect of pro-
viding only select subsidies to Medicaid recipients.87 The Minnesota
Supreme Court, for instance, stated:
Indigent women . . . are precisely the ones who would be most af-
fected by an offer of monetary assistance, and it is these women
who are targeted by the statutory funding ban. We simply cannot
say that an indigent woman’s decision whether to terminate her
pregnancy is not significantly impacted by the state’s offer of
comprehensive medical services if the woman carries the preg-
nancy to term.88
childbirth a more attractive alternative than abortion for persons eligible
for Medicaid.
Id. at 325 (majority opinion).
84. McRae, 448 U.S. at 333–34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 330 n.4.
86. Id. at 333.
87. Vanzi, supra note 67, at 446. See, e.g., Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers,
625 P.2d 779, 798 (Cal. 1981) (stating that the decision whether or not to have an abortion
is guaranteed to every woman, rich or poor, free from government coercion).
88. Women of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 31 (Minn. 1995).
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Similarly, the opinion dismantling Connecticut’s funding restric-
tion referred to this situation as “the poor woman’s dilemma.” 89 Like
the Minnesota scheme, the Connecticut Medicaid program paid for all
pregnancy and childbirth related costs, while only subsidizing abor-
tions when a woman’s life was in danger.90 But other restrictions in
Connecticut’s welfare system served to make that state’s Medicaid
ban on abortion coverage even worse.
Calling the restriction a cruel one, the court explained how the
policy placed a woman “in a trap” with no financial or legal recourse.91
The recipient was not allowed to receive funds from any other sources
without that amount being deducted from her welfare allowance the
following month.92 Failing to report such a loan could disqualify her
from future benefits and subject her to criminal charges.93 “Because
payments [were] made directly to the provider and no cash allowance
[was] given for medical assistance, [the recipient was not] given the
choice of being able to forego [sic] other medical necessities in favor
of the abortion.” 94 The court concluded, “the state has boxed her into
accepting the pregnancy and carrying the fetus to term.”95 It was this
coercion that forced the court to find the scheme unconstitutional.
The record is clear that Hyde was designed to discourage people
from exercising a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy.96 But
the McRae Court only tepidly acknowledged that the amendment
could result in more pregnancies being carried to term than would
have occurred without it.97 Instead, the Court tried to absolve the
government of any role in these altered outcomes, or in the decision-
making process itself, suggesting it is the pregnant woman’s poverty
alone that may push her into continuing an unwanted pregnancy—
not the government’s action in financially supporting childbirth or
its inaction in not supporting the alternative.98
Justice Brennan disagreed, observing, “For what the Court fails
to appreciate is that it is not simply the woman’s indigency that
89. Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 153 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
90. Id. at 137.
91. Id. at 153.
92. Id. at 154.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Maher, 515 A.2d at 154.
96. The Hyde Amendment has far-reaching influence. The very existence of a slanted
funding scheme expresses a value judgment and inserts the government’s voice into public
and private conversations about abortion. In the current climate of abortion stigma, this
implicit judgment could cause any person, regardless of insurance source, to feel ashamed
of her abortion or intimidate her enough not to have one. See Anuradha Kumar et al.,
Conceptualising Abortion Stigma, 11 CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 625, 633–35 (2009).
97. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980).
98. Id. at 316.
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interferes with her freedom of choice, but the combination of her own
poverty and the Government’s unequal subsidization of abortion and
childbirth.” 99 Recognizing the full implications of the policy, he con-
cluded that the Hyde Amendment “both by design and in effect . . .
serves to coerce indigent pregnant women to bear children that they
would otherwise elect not to have.”100
3. Unconstitutional Conditions
The government may choose how to distribute its largesse, in-
cluding deciding whether, what, and whom to fund through social
safety-net programs.101 However, it must do so within constitutional
constraints.102 The Supreme Court has reviewed a variety of cases re-
garding the conditional allocations of benefits, including those in-
volving public assistance, and it has taken different approaches to
determining the constitutionality of the conditions applied.103 One
of the most commonly applied analytic frameworks for judicial review
of these cases is the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.104
The Supreme Court first recognized the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine in 1926 in Frost & Frost Trucking Company v. Railroad
Commission of California, declaring:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state
legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip
the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but
to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under
the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable priv-
ilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not
99. Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 330.
101. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977).
102. Id. at 469–70.
103. According to Professor Lynn A. Baker, analyses used to examine conditioned allo-
cations include the “right/privilege distinction,” “the Pareto superiority test of modern
welfare economics and its implied ‘bargain’ model,” and a “motivation analysis.” Lynn A.
Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1190 (1990); see also Candice T. Player, Public Assistance, Drug
Testing, and the Law: The Limits of Population-Based Legal Analysis, 40 AM. J.L. & MED.
26, 75 (2014). Baker analyzed the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing of welfare
recipients and explained that when analyzing unconstitutional conditions claims,
Courts will usually begin by asking whether the condition “burdens” or
“impinges upon” protected interests. If so, courts will require the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored to a com-
pelling governmental interest. If not, courts will sustain the regulation with
evidence of a rational relationship between means and ends.
Baker, supra.
104. Baker, supra note 103, at 1193–94.
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necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the
state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it
upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the
state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is
that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquish-
ment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the sur-
render of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it
may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceiv-
able that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United
States may thus be manipulated out of existence.105
Since then, the doctrine has been applied—often without explicit
mention—to cases involving liquor licenses,106 cash assistance,107
unemployment benefits,108 and more.
Essentially, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits the
government from conditioning the receipt of discretionary benefits
on the waiver of a constitutionally protected right.109 While this clas-
sical iteration may seem straightforward in concept, its application
has been anything but simple.110
In the absence of a clear explanation from the Court as to when
and how the unconstitutional conditions doctrine will apply, and with
what degree of scrutiny, lower courts and commentators have been left
to connect the dots and try to pull patterns from the pages. Professor
Lynn Baker has identified several themes in the Court’s rhetoric:
105. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926)
(holding that the railroad commission cannot require certain actions by the trucking
company merely because it is required to obtain a permit).
106. Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1994) (striking down two Rhode
Island statutes that prohibited advertisement of alcohol prices as abridging speech under
the First Amendment).
107. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317–18 (1971) (holding that the receipt of public
assistance depending on consent to a welfare official’s entry into one’s home is not a vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (holding that the welfare family cap did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because it did not deprive the youngest child of any and all
aid, but rather diminished the lot of the entire family); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 (1969) (holding that a statutory provision denying public assistance benefits on
the basis of duration of residency constituted invidious discrimination).
108. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398 (1963) (overruled on other grounds by Emp’t
Div., Ore. Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883–85 (1990)) (holding that con-
ditioning unemployment benefits on a requirement to work on the Sabbath unconstitu-
tionally penalizes the free exercise of religion).
109. See Carole M. Hirsch, When the War on Poverty Became the War on Poor,
Pregnant Women: Political Rhetoric, the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, and the
Family Cap Restriction, 8 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 335, 352 (2002) (“[O]nce the
government chooses to provide a benefit, it may not force the recipient to surrender a
constitutional right to receive it.”).
110. Baker, supra note 103, at 1194.
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The Court, in its search, has taken the perspective of the poten-
tial beneficiary and has focused on the extent and type of burden
presented by the condition. Not surprisingly, given this perspec-
tive, the rhetoric of individual “choice” versus “coercion” perme-
ates its discussions. In determining which conditions are coercive
and therefore impermissible, the Court has explicitly looked to
such characteristics as the “directness” or “substantiality” of the
condition’s impact, the likelihood that the condition will deter the
exercise of a constitutional right, the “germaneness” of the condi-
tion to the purpose of the benefit program, and the “importance”
of the individual right or interest burdened.111
Many of these concepts and phrases appear in the McRae decision,
particularly in the dissents.
The McRae Court stated that because the government was not
required to cover any healthcare benefits through Medicaid, it could
choose to exclude certain benefits or set conditions for the receipt of
that benefit.112 As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, “Implicit in
the Court’s reasoning is the notion that as long as the Government is
not obligated to provide its citizens with certain benefits or privi-
leges, it may condition the grant of such benefits on the recipient’s
relinquishment of his constitutional rights.”113 More recent assess-
ments, however, have clarified that the discretionary nature of a par-
ticular benefit does not prohibit application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.114
The most robust treatment of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine by the majority appeared in a footnote.115 There, the Court
denied that the Hyde Amendment imposes a penalty on Medicaid
recipients who exercise their right to choose abortion; “[a] refusal to
fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the
imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.”116
The Court then went on to state what would constitute an
unconstitutional condition: if a woman were to lose eligibility to all
Medicaid benef its because she exercised her constitutional right to
have an abortion.117 But because the Hyde Amendment does not
111. Id. at 1194–95 (citations omitted).
112. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308–09 (1980).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 571 U.S. 484, 513 (1984) (“Even though gov-
ernment is under no obligation to provide a person, or the public, a particular benefit,
it does not follow that conferral of the benefit may be conditioned on the surrender of a
constitutional right.”).
115. McRae, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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condition all Medicaid benefits on the surrender of a constitutional
right, it is valid.
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the Court’s as-
sessment missed a critical element.118 The government is not simply
refusing to pay the costs associated with a protected activity—in this
case the right to terminate a pregnancy—it is paying the costs of one
outcome of pregnancy but not the other.119 “[T]he Court overlooks the
fact that there is ‘more’ than a simple refusal to fund a protected ac-
tivity in this case; instead, there is a program that selectively funds
but one of two choices of a constitutionally protected decision, thereby
penalizing the election of the disfavored option.”120
Justice Brennan analogized the government’s one-sided finan-
cial support of a pregnant woman’s decision to a hypothetical program
in which the government would provide free transportation to the
polls for a Democratic voter but no such service to a Republican voter:
[I]t is no answer to assert that no “penalty” is being imposed
because the State is only refusing to pay for the specific costs of
the protected activity rather than withholding other Medicaid
benefits to which the recipient would be entitled or taking some
other action more readily characterized as “punitive.” Surely the
Government could not provide free transportation to the polling
booths only for those citizens who vote for Democratic candidates,
even though the failure to provide the same benefit to Republi-
cans “represents simply a refusal to subsidize certain protected
conduct,” . . . and does not involve the denial of any other gov-
ernmental benefits.121
Although the Court recognized and condoned Congress’s choice
to favor one pregnancy option (childbirth), it failed to recognize the
corollary, which is that the other option (abortion) is necessarily dis-
favored.122 Justice Brennan was quick to observe how this led to an
unprecedented result: “It suffices to note that we have heretofore
never hesitated to invalidate any scheme of granting or withholding
financial benefits that incidentally or intentionally burdens one man-
ner of exercising a constitutionally protected choice.”123
In response to the Court’s argument that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine would be triggered only if all Medicaid benefits
were denied to a woman who sought an abortion, Justice Brennan
118. Id. at 336 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. McRae, 448 U.S. at 336 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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explained, “Whether the State withholds only the special costs of a
disfavored option or penalizes the individual more broadly for the
manner in which she exercises her choice, it cannot interfere with a
constitutionally protected decision through the coercive use of gov-
ernmental largesse.”124
Justices Brennan and Marshall also found that the Hyde Amend-
ment creates an unconstitutional condition because for some women
it has the same effect—rendering abortion out of reach—as would
an outright prohibition on that activity.125 Justice Brennan criticized
the Court for not recognizing the amendment as a de facto ban: “The
fundamental flaw in the Court’s due process analysis . . . is its failure
to acknowledge that the discriminatory distribution of the benefits
of governmental largesse can discourage the exercise of fundamental
liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial of those rights
through criminal and regulatory sanctions.”126
Justice Marshall echoed Justice Brennan’s assertion that a de-
nial in funding is tantamount to the outright denial of abortion: “The
Court’s opinion studiously avoids recognizing the undeniable fact that,
for women eligible for Medicaid—poor women—denial of a Medicaid-
funded abortion is equivalent to denial of a legal abortion altogether.
By definition, these women do not have the money to pay for an abor-
tion themselves.”127
Unlike the majority, which did not give treatment to the real-life
consequences of the amendment, Justice Marshall concentrated on the
impact it has on the affected population.128 He concluded, “The Court
perceives this result as simply a distinction between a ‘limitation on
governmental power’ and ‘an affirmative funding obligation.’ For a
poor person attempting to exercise her ‘right’ to freedom of choice,
the difference is imperceptible.”129
Like Justices Marshall and Brennan, a handful of state court
judges have applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to in-
validate state restrictions on Medicaid coverage for abortion.130 For
instance, in striking down Connecticut’s ban on state Medicaid funds
to pay for most abortions, the Superior Court wrote that while there
124. Id.
125. Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion
Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 398 (2013) (explaining that “for the [McRae] dissent, not only
was the abortion recognized as an aspect of healthcare, but the abortion right included
access to abortion services. This led to the conclusion that laws that restricted access also
restricted the right itself.”).
126. McRae, 448 U.S. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 347 (citation omitted).
130. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 151 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
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is no mandate that a state provide entitlements such as welfare, a
state may not extend or refuse to extend such entitlements in a con-
stitutionally impermissible manner.131 Not only are fundamental free-
doms protected from overt attacks, the court wrote, but also from
being stifled by more subtle government interference.132 The court
held that the state’s Medicaid scheme constituted a de facto ban on
abortion for low-income women and that such a ban amounted to an
impermissible penalty for being poor.133
The practical effect of the Hyde policy is that some Medicaid-
eligible women who want to terminate their pregnancies will end up
carrying to term.134 Under the Hyde Amendment, Medicaid recipi-
ents who do as the government wants, relinquish their right to abor-
tion, and carry a pregnancy to term are compensated with coverage
for all of their prenatal care and labor and delivery services.135
Those who act against the government’s wishes, and exercise their
right to abortion, are punished. Their medical care is not covered, so
they must beg, borrow, sell, and sacrifice to pull together the money
to pay for their care—often at great detriment to both themselves
and their families.136
Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, it should be no
more acceptable for the government to condition a poor woman’s re-
ceipt of Medicaid assistance for pregnancy-related care on the abro-
gation of her abortion right than it would be for the government to
outlaw abortion directly.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 151–52.
133. Id. at 152 (“[T]he regulation impinges upon those constitutional rights to the same
practical extent as if the state were to affirmatively rule that poor women were prohibited
from obtaining an abortion.”).
134. STANLEY K. HENSHAW ET AL., RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICAID FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS:
A LITERATURE REVIEW 21 (2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/MedicaidLit
Review.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8ESS-XSH9; Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the
Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER
POL. REV. 1, 16 (2007) [hereinafter Heart of the Matter] (“Studies published over the course
of two decades looking at a number of states concluded that 18–35% of women who would
have had an abortion continued their pregnancies after Medicaid funding was cut off.”).
135. However, should these women live in one of sixteen states with welfare family caps,
the child they are forced to carry may not be eligible for cash aid; thus, the woman and her
family will be driven deeper into poverty, suffering the repercussions of food insecurity,
housing instability, struggles paying for diapers and clothing, and health problems stem-
ming from these social determinants. ELENA R. GUTIÉRREZ, CTR. ON REPROD. RIGHTS &
JUST., BRINGING FAMILIES OUT OF ‘CAP’TIVITY: THE NEED TO REPEAL THE CALWORKS
MAXIMUM FAMILY GRANT RULE 3 (2013), available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files
/bccj/CRRJ_Issue_Brief_MFG_Rule_FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZHC6-ZALX.
136. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, WHOSE CHOICE? HOW THE HYDE AMENDMENT
HURTS POOR WOMEN 28–29 (2010), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr
.civicactions.net/files/documents/Hyde_Report_FINAL_nospreads.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/56BV-PNFL.
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B. Wrong Level of Review
Only seven years after Roe v. Wade had been decided, the Court
in McRae departed from its holding in Roe that abortion regulations
be subject to strict scrutiny—indeed, one could argue this retreat
began even earlier, with Maher and Beal. Under the strict scrutiny
standard of review, the government must show that any abortion re-
striction is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest.137 Within only a few years, the Court retreated from Roe’s
watershed precedent in its series of abortion funding cases, which
culminated in McRae.138
Justice Stewart acknowledged that Roe recognized “a freedom
of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life,” in-
cluding “the freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy.”139 However, he stated that Roe merely “ ‘protects the
woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy’ ” and does not prevent
the state from making “ ‘a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion, and . . . implement[ing] that judgment by the allocation of
public funds.’ ”140
Justice Stewart’s language presaged the “undue burden” standard
articulated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that formally replaced
Roe’s strict scrutiny standard.141 While many view Casey as the be-
ginning of the undue burden standard, in fact the Court started to
subtly employ it as early as 1977 in the companion cases of Maher v.
Roe and Beal v. Doe, discussed above.142 It later implicitly applied the
standard to minors in Hodgson v. Minnesota.143 In other words, the
Court initially tested out the undue burden standard on poor women,
then applied it to minors, and eventually extended it to all women.
Stewart reasoned in McRae that the Hyde Amendment “places
no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to
137. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
720 (2007).
138. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316–18 (1980) (distinguishing unwarranted
government interference from entitlement).
139. Id. at 312.
140. Id. at 314 (emphasis added) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977)).
141. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835–37 (1992).
142. “The Supreme Court first explicitly used the undue standard within the abortion
context in a line of cases concerning government funding of abortions.” Valerie J. Pacer,
Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard—Is It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden Standard
and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 297 (1995).
143. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 449, 461 (1990) (stating that a forty-eight hour
waiting period “imposes only a minimal burden” on a minor’s right to an abortion and that
the judicial bypass procedure avoids “unduly burdening” a minor’s right to abortion).
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terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidi-
zation of abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative
activity deemed in the public interest.”144 Again, Stewart’s language
foreshadowed Casey’s definition of an undue burden as a restriction
that has “the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”145
The Court took pains in both Maher and McRae to draw a distinc-
tion between inserting an obstacle into, versus removing an obstacle
from, a woman’s path to obtaining an abortion. The Court concluded
that while the state was prohibited from pursuing the former, it was
not obligated to undertake the latter.146 According to Justice Stewart,
because the government did not create a poor woman’s indigency, it
was not obligated to remedy it when she was in need of an abortion.147
Having made this distinction, Stewart easily found that, regard-
less of the liberty interest recognized in Roe, “it simply does not follow
that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional en-
titlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range
of protected choices.”148
The dissenting justices, however, recognized the majority’s opin-
ion as a stark departure from precedent. As Justice Marshall ob-
served, “The Court’s decision today marks a retreat from Roe v.
Wade and represents a cruel blow to the most powerless members
of our society.”149 He dispensed with the false dichotomy drawn by
the majority by stating that for the women involved, it was a distinc-
tion without a difference.150
Justice Stevens’s dissent pointed out that Roe allowed for no
burden whatsoever on the right to an abortion before viability:
[T]he Court explicitly held that prior to fetal viability [the govern-
ment’s interest in potential human life] may not justify any gov-
ernmental burden on the woman’s choice to have an abortion . . . .
In effect, the Court held that a woman’s freedom to elect to have
an abortion prior to fetal viability has absolute constitutional
protection, subject only to valid health regulations. . . . We have
a duty to respect that holding. The Court simply shirks that duty
in this case.151
144. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
145. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
146. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316.
147. Id. at 316–17.
148. Id. at 316.
149. Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 347.
151. Id. at 350–51 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Justice Brennan agreed that Roe at a minimum imposed a com-
plete prohibition on the regulation of a first-trimester abortion: “Roe
and its progeny established that the pregnant woman has a right to
be free from state interference with her choice to have an abor-
tion—a right which, at least prior to the end of the first trimester,
absolutely prohibits any governmental regulation of that highly
personal decision.”152
Under the precedent that existed at the time—i.e., Roe and
the Court’s apparent commitment to a health exception in Maher
and Beal—many believed that the Hyde Amendment violated the
Constitution: it regulated pre-viability abortion without furthering
a valid health interest—and indeed it contravened the health inter-
ests of pregnant women; it amounted to an outright prohibition on
abortion for many poor women who could not afford to pay for an
abortion out of pocket; and it used the state’s power and the public
purse to influence a woman’s decision whether to continue or end a
pregnancy.153 Only by disregarding precedent—and the conditions of
poor women’s lives—could the Court come to a contrary conclusion.
Nor is it a cure to say that Casey’s undue burden standard is
now the law of the land and therefore the Hyde Amendment is valid
under current doctrine even if it should not have been upheld in
McRae. Despite the many encroachments on Roe over the years, its
central tenet still stands—the right to decide to have an abortion is
fundamental.154 As such, it should be treated like any other funda-
mental right: any regulation that burdens it should be subject to
heightened scrutiny.155
Before Casey, the Supreme Court consistently defined funda-
mental rights as those that remain insulated from the continu-
ally shifting political majority. The undue burden standard,
however, subtly undermines the protective barrier surrounding
any fundamental right. It allows the current political majority
to actively interfere with its citizens’ exercise of their fundamental
rights, so long as such interference does not amount to an undue
burden. Because it allows such interference, the undue burden
standard appears irreconcilable with traditional fundamental
rights protection.156
152. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 370, 330 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
153. Id. at 329–34.
154. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (“[A] state may not pro-
hibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability.”).
155. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing for
“particularly careful scrutiny” for personal liberties).
156. Pacer, supra note 142, at 313.
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Indeed, states across the country have correctly recognized the
right to abortion as fundamental. While states are bound by federal
precedent when interpreting federal law, states are free to interpret
their own constitutional guarantees to provide greater protection of
rights.157 Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York courts, among
others, have all recognized the privacy right, which includes abortion,
to be a fundamental one warranting some form of heightened review,
if not strict scrutiny.158 Accordingly, these state courts balanced a preg-
nant Medicaid recipient’s interest in obtaining an abortion against the
state’s interest in protecting fetal life and, in some cases, the state’s
fiscal interests. In all but one case, the courts found that a woman’s
fundamental right to abortion cannot be so impinged by the state
without a more compelling state interest.159
Simply put, because McRae failed to treat the abortion decision
as the fundamental right it was declared to be in Roe, the case was
wrongly decided at the time. Though the Court has loosened its stan-
dards for abortion protections over the years, strategies should be
developed for reinstating abortion as a fundamental right and en-
suring that women have the means to pay for abortion care.
C. The Right to Health
In the course of articulating a fundamental right to choose abor-
tion, the Roe Court identified a governmental interest in maternal
health so strong that at no point in pregnancy is it outweighed by an
interest in the potential life of the fetus.160 Whereas Roe required
157. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 295 (2008).
158. Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 28 P.3d 904, 909–10
(Alaska 2001); Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28, 34–35
(Ariz. 2002); Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 781 (Cal. 1981); Moe
v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 402 (Mass. 1981); Women of Minn. v. Gomez,
542 N.W.2d 17, 31 (Minn. 1995); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982);
Hope v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183, 187 (N.Y. 1994); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 150–51
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Vanzi, supra note 67, at 452 (citing Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez,
111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (1991)) (stating that the New Mexico court determined the
right to privacy to be a fundamental one and includes a “legally protected interest in
limiting the size” of one’s family).
159. See, e.g., Byrne, 450 A.2d at 935 (holding that the restriction was subject to strict
scrutiny; that the state must demonstrate a compelling state interest; that there was no
less restrictive alternative available; and that while the protection of potential life is a
legitimate state interest, at no point in pregnancy may it outweigh the superior interest
in the life and health of mother). But cf. Hope v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183, 187 (N.Y. 1994)
(recognizing the abortion right as fundamental, but finding that the state’s Medicaid
program did not burden the exercise of that right).
160. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–65. The National Organization for Women (NOW) and fellow
amici expounded on the primacy of the health interest in their brief in the case of Harris
v. McRae:
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states to make exceptions to restrictions on abortion when the preg-
nant woman’s health is at stake, the Hyde Amendment does not.161
As noted above, the Hyde Amendment prohibits federal Medicaid cov-
erage for all abortions, except for those necessary to save the life of the
pregnant woman or for pregnancies resulting from rape or incest.162
There is no federal coverage for abortion in cases where a pregnancy
threatens, causes, or exacerbates a physical or psychological health
problem for the woman. An undeniable effect of the amendment, then,
is to threaten or even worsen women’s health with no guarantee of
ultimately protecting fetal life. Nevertheless, the McRae Court ig-
nored the government’s interest in maternal health in favor of its
interest in the fetus. In doing so and in upholding an abortion re-
striction without a health exemption, the Court implicitly overrode
one of the most fundamental tenets of Roe.163
The ramifications of the Hyde Amendment are well documented.
A woman with a medically compromised pregnancy who lacks the
necessary resources to pay for an abortion out of pocket must carry
the pregnancy longer in order to cobble together the funds to pay for
the procedure.164 She thus suffers additional pain, discomfort, and
debilitation, increasing the risk of permanent injury.165 If she is able
to obtain an abortion, it will be at a later gestational stage, increas-
ing both the financial costs and physical risks of the procedure.166 If
Moreover, the pregnant woman’s health is the only factor that overrides the
state’s interest in protecting fetal life after viability. At this time the state
may regulate and even prohibit some abortions; however, even after viability
this broad power is subordinated to the woman’s interest in her health. . . .
Thus, even in the last trimester of pregnancy when the woman’s right to pri-
vacy has been ruled to be the weakest, the state may not restrict access to
abortion in a manner dangerous to the woman’s health.
Brief for Nat’l Org. of Women et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268) 1980 WL 339661 (internal citations omitted).
161. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 136, at 15; see also Laurence Tribe, The
Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma
of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 331 (1985).
162. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
163. It was not until Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 330–32 (2006), that
the Court formally held that, while state restrictions on abortion ought to include pro-
tections for women’s health, the lack of a health exception would not necessarily render
a law facially invalid.
164. Brief for Planned Parenthood Fed’n of America et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees, Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (Nos. 79-4, 79-5, 79-491), 1980 WL
339465 [hereinafter Brief for Planned Parenthood].
165. There are a variety of physical conditions that can worsen during pregnancy or
increase other pregnancy-related risks, including heart disease, diabetes, cancer, blood
clots, and sickle cell anemia. Pregnancy can also aggravate mental health conditions, par-
ticularly when women are forced to carry pregnancies under duress. Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 339 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. It bears mention that, while abortion is an extremely safe medical procedure with
an overall complication rate of 0.05% during the first trimester, the risks increase as a
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she is unable to obtain an abortion, because she cannot procure the
needed funds or because she has surpassed the time limits for when
abortion care is available, she will be forced to carry a dangerous preg-
nancy to term, give birth, and risk permanent disability or death.167
Another unfortunate possibility for a poor pregnant woman with a
high-risk pregnancy is that she will seek the least expensive abortion
option available, possibly exposing herself to substandard care, again
increasing the risks to her health and life.168
Justice Marshall illustrated the gravity of the Hyde prohibition
when drawn out to its logical conclusion: “Federal funding is thus
unavailable even when severe and long-lasting health damage to the
mother is a virtual certainty.”169 State courts have echoed Justice
Marshall’s concerns. The California Supreme Court, in examining the
state’s limitation on Medi-Cal funding for abortion, noted that the pri-
mary purpose of the state’s welfare program was to promote health.170
The restriction, the court stated, did just the opposite: “The restric-
tions at issue here directly impede this fundamental purpose. Even
when an abortion represents the appropriate medical treatment for
pregnancy continues. Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST.
(July 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/85KM-M8XZ. Thus an early abortion is always safer than a later abortion, even
for pregnancies that do not otherwise pose a risk to the health of the woman or the fetus.
At the same time, abortion at any stage of pregnancy is statistically safer than carrying
a pregnancy to term—maternal mortality and morbidity rates are an average of fourteen
times lower for women who terminate pregnancies than for those who carry to term and
deliver. See Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal
Induced Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
215, 216 (2012).
167. Zbaraz amici noted the dangers of delay in their briefs:
By definition, Medicaid-eligible women do not have sufficient income and re-
sources to meet the costs of necessary medical services. The denial of funding
leaves these women with few courses of action other than forgoing needed
abortions or procuring the additional funds necessary to finance legal abor-
tions. Because an abortion is medically necessary only when it is likely that
pregnancy or childbirth will entail excessive risks, forgoing such an abortion
necessarily exposes a woman to a significant possibility of health damage or
death. Even if a woman ultimately is able to secure the funds to pay for an
abortion, the delay that occurs while she collects the funds itself involves
health risks and also magnifies the risks inherent in the abortion procedure.
Brief for Planned Parenthood, supra note 164 (citations omitted).
168. For example, the Hyde Amendment was a factor facilitating the predatory practices
of Dr. Kermit Gosnell, a Philadelphia physician who preyed upon poor and low-income
women in providing gravely substandard and illegal abortions, which resulted in the death
of at least one of his patients. See Jessica Arons, Anti-Abortion Movement Made Gosnell’s
Crimes Possible: Making Abortion Accessible and Affordable Will Make It Safer Too,
POLITIX (May 1, 2013), http://politix.topix.com/story/5854-anti-abortion-movement-made
-gosnells-crimes-possible, archived at http://perma.cc/9GZD-577J.
169. McRae, 448 U.S. at 339 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 790 (Cal. 1981).
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a poor pregnant woman, the statute virtually bars payment for that
treatment and thus subjects the poor woman to significant health
hazards and in some cases to death.”171
In practice, the line between a condition that threatens a preg-
nant woman’s health and one that threatens her life is blurry and
ever-changing. As Justice Marshall observed, “By the time a preg-
nancy has progressed to the point where a physician is able to cer-
tify that it endangers the life of the mother, it is in many cases too
late to prevent her death, because abortion is no longer safe.” 172
Moreover, there are serious ethical considerations about any policy
that forces doctors to withhold medical treatment until a condition
becomes life-threatening.173
The Court in Roe noted that a pregnant woman’s interest in pro-
tecting her health is prominent and central to the fundamental right
to choose abortion articulated therein.174 The McRae ruling acknowl-
edged as much: “[I]t could be argued that the freedom of a woman to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons does,
in fact, lie at the core of the constitutional liberty identified in [Roe v.]
Wade.”175 Even so, the Court maintained that this interest does not
impose upon the government an obligation to finance the abortions
that women need to protect themselves from known or foreseeable
harms to their health.176
And while the Court at least recognized the pregnant woman’s
own interest in protecting her health, it did not concern itself with
the established governmental interest in a woman’s health, nor in the
paramount nature of the health interest when weighed against other
governmental interests in the abortion context.177 But it is hard to
imagine how the policy in question could be perceived as furthering
the state’s interest in the pregnant woman’s health when it so clearly
interfered with her own interest in the same.178
171. Id.; see also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1982) (stating that
New Jersey’s restriction “gives priority to potential life at the expense of maternal
health”); id. at 941 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (writing that
“[t]he right to choose whether or not to bear a child is partly grounded on the constitu-
tional right to health” and agreeing with the lower court’s proclamation that New Jersey
recognizes a fundamental right to health).
172. McRae, 448 U.S. at 339–40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 316 (majority opinion).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. “[T]he premise underlying the Hyde Amendment was repudiated in Roe v. Wade,
where the Court made clear that the state interest in protecting fetal life cannot justify
jeopardizing the life or health of the mother.” Id. at 338 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
178. Illinois does not and cannot argue that . . . its denial of Medicaid funding for
medically necessary abortions promotes the health of women. Instead, . . . the
Illinois statute can serve only to interfere substantially with the woman’s
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Instead, the Court focused exclusively on the government’s in-
terest in protecting fetal life, as though it existed in isolation and not
in relationship to other interests.179 Justice Stevens pointed out the
origin and nature of the relational interests in his dissent:
[I]t is misleading to speak of the Government’s legitimate inter-
est in the fetus without reference to the context in which that
interest was held to be legitimate. For Roe v. Wade squarely held
that the States may not protect that interest when a conflict with
the interest in a pregnant woman’s health exists.180
With this isolated focus, the Court determined that the Hyde
Amendment was rationally related to the government’s legitimate
interest in potential life.181 In so holding, the Court effectively over-
ruled its own precedent—which required the state’s interest in the
health of the pregnant woman to trump its interest in the potential
life of the fetus throughout pregnancy—to allow for the converse,
where the state could favor its interest in fetal life over its interest
in a woman’s health.
Had the Court appropriately applied the balancing test estab-
lished in Roe and respected that precedent, it would have found the
lack of a health exception to be unconstitutional and struck down the
Hyde Amendment accordingly.182 Justice Stevens was perplexed by
the Court’s silence about contradicting its own precedent:
It is thus perfectly clear that neither the Federal Government nor
the States may exclude a woman from medical benef its to which
she would otherwise be entitled solely to further an interest in po-
tential life when a physician, “in appropriate medical judgment,”
certifies that an abortion is necessary “for the preservation of the
life or health of the mother.” The Court totally fails to explain
why this reasoning is not dispositive here.183
When the Court has declared that women seeking abortion care
have a liberty interest in protecting their health, that the govern-
ment shares that interest, and that it trumps the state’s interest in
potential fetal life throughout pregnancy, it is inconsistent for the
Court to determine that the state’s interest in potential fetal life could
interest in her health and to thwart rather than advance the state’s interest
in her health.
Brief for Planned Parenthood, supra note 164.
179. See Tribe, supra note 161, at 338–39.
180. McRae, 448 U.S. at 351 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 324 (majority opinion).
182. Id. at 351 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 351–52 (citation omitted).
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justify a policy that predictably harms women’s health and only facili-
tates childbirth in a minority of cases.
D. Novel Equal Protection Claims
In this section, we offer a handful of nascent Equal Protection
Clause theories that might merit further exploration and develop-
ment. While several state courts have applied state equal protection
laws to protect against sex discrimination to great effect,184 the fed-
eral court system has not yet followed suit. Thus, we have tried to
tease out areas in federal law that could be further expanded. We
recognize that the current jurisprudence in support of these theories
is far from robust, at least in the context of abortion funding and
coverage. Nevertheless, we hope to encourage further scholarship
that might unearth some creative thinking, which, over time, would
become persuasive.
1. Suspect Classification
While racial classifications are inherently suspect and there-
fore always subject to strict scrutiny,185 the factors in the infamous
184. More than a third of states now have explicit constitutional gender equality guar-
antees that ban sex discrimination. Kolbert & Gans, supra note 49, at 1166. In addition,
thirty-five states have ratified the Equal Rights Amendment passed by Congress in 1972,
which reads that “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of sex.” The Equal Rights Amendment: Unfinished
Business for the Constitution, THE ALICE PAUL INST., http://www.equalrightsamendment
.org/faq.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/M2JV-65U3.
“In construing these guarantees, several state courts have subjected laws that dis-
criminate against women to a higher standard of review than afforded under the Federal
Constitution.” Kolbert & Gans, supra note 49, at 1166–67. In particular, some state courts
have held that Medicaid coverage restrictions on abortion amount to impermissible gender
discrimination. Id. at 1167–68. Because only women obtain abortions, the effect of the
restriction falls only on women, whereas the government does not similarly interfere with
men’s reproductive decisions. Id. This line of reasoning has successfully dismantled abor-
tion coverage restrictions in states such as Connecticut, New Mexico, and Oregon. See
N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841, 855–56 (N.M. 1998); Planned
Parenthood Ass’n v. Dep’t of Human Res., 663 P.2d 1247, 1259, 1261 (Or. Ct. App. 1983);
Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 158–62 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
Perhaps the Connecticut court stated it best when it recognized that throughout history:
[W]omen’s biology and their ability to bear children have been used as a basis
for discrimination against them. . . . Since only women become pregnant, dis-
crimination against pregnancy by not funding abortion when it is medically
necessary and when all other medical expenses are paid by the state for both
men and women is sex oriented discrimination. “Pregnancy is a condition
unique to women, and the ability to become pregnant is a primary charac-
teristic of the female sex. Thus any classification which relies on pregnancy
as the determinative criterion is a distinction based on sex.”
Maher, 515 A.2d 159 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
185. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
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Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co.186 and its
progeny have been used to admit or deny entry to the somewhat
nebulous category of “suspect classifications” sufficient to trigger
heightened scrutiny of a law that disadvantages other groups of
people. We posit here that perhaps women who seek abortions,187
especially low-income women who seek abortions, are a class meriting
suspect status under the criteria laid out in Carolene Footnote 4 and
subsequent jurisprudence.188
Carolene held that restrictions on economic activity were pre-
sumptively valid but observed that other types of regulations might
be subject to closer scrutiny:
It is unnecessary to consider now . . . . Whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.189
Justice Marshall specifically cited this language, noting that “the
fact that the burden of the Hyde Amendment falls exclusively on fi-
nancially destitute women suggests” exactly the type of special condi-
tion identified in the Carolene footnote that deserves more attention.190
While it could be debated whether low-income women who seek
abortions are a “discrete and insular minority,” having that status
186. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
187. While we use the phrase “women who seek abortions” in order to draw a legal clas-
sification with sufficient specificity, we are mindful of the propaganda used by the anti-
abortion movement to suggest that only certain women are “abortion-minded” or that
there is an artificial division between the women who have children and those who have
abortions. The reality is that one in three women in the United States will have an abor-
tion by the age of forty-five and that 60% of women who terminate a pregnancy already
have one child or more at the time they have an abortion. HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL.,
GUTTMACHER INST., ABORTION IN WOMEN’S LIVES 20 (2006), available at http://www
.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/05/04/AiWL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EU7Q-4QVE.
Therefore, “women who seek an abortion” are more likely than not also women who have
children, just at different stages of their lives. Nevertheless, it is when women seek an
abortion that they are most likely to be targeted by lawmakers and singled out for dis-
parate treatment.
188. We recognize that the Maher Court stated that “an indigent woman desiring an
abortion does not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recog-
nized by our cases.” Maher, 432 U.S. at 470–71. But we would submit that such a finding
be revisited for the reasons outlined in this subsection. Indeed, the lower court opinion
in McRae in the Eastern District of New York found that young, poor women seeking abor-
tion care were a suspect class. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 738 (E.D.N.Y.
1980); see also Rhonda Copelon & Sylvia Law, “Nearly Allied to Her Right to Be”—
Medicaid Funding for Abortion: The Story of Harris v. McRae, in WOMEN & THE LAW
STORIES 207 (Elizabeth M. Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011).
189. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
190. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 343–44 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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is not a prerequisite for proving a suspect classification: “Nor has this
Court held that discreteness and insularity constitute necessary pre-
conditions to a holding that a particular classification is invidious.”191
At its core, the Carolene standard is one that was designed
(though not always applied) to protect politically unpopular minori-
ties who have been unable to protect themselves through the polit-
ical process. In other words, it is a countermajoritarian backstop
against the prejudices that can hold sway in majority rule. As Bruce
Ackerman has noted, “the [post-Lochner] New Court would accord
special protection to those who had been deprived of their fair share
of political influence.”192
Nevertheless, it was evident to the McRae dissenters, and to any-
one aware of the lived experiences of low-income women, that the
women directly affected by the Hyde Amendment are politically pow-
erless.193 A key section of Justice Brennan’s dissent bears repeating:
[T]he Hyde Amendment is a transparent attempt by the Legisla-
tive Branch to impose the political majority’s judgment of the
morally acceptable and socially desirable preference on a sensi-
tive and intimate decision that the Constitution entrusts to the
individual. Worse yet, the Hyde Amendment does not foist that
majoritarian viewpoint with equal measure upon everyone in
our Nation, rich and poor alike; rather it imposes that viewpoint
only upon that segment of society which, because of its position
of political powerlessness, is least able to defend its privacy rights
from the encroachments of state-mandated morality.194
Justice Marshall likewise referred to the class affected as “the
most powerless members of our society,”195 noting that the “cruel
impact” of the legislation “falls exclusively on indigent pregnant
women.”196
191. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978).
192. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985).
193. It is important here to draw a distinction between people who support abortion
rights and women who seek an abortion, as the two groups are not interchangeable. Some
women who will seek or have sought an abortion may consider themselves to be “Pro-Life”
and may support political candidates who oppose abortion; others may base their vote on
issues other than a candidate’s position on abortion; still others may not exercise their
right to vote at all; and some (i.e., unnaturalized immigrants and some women convicted
of felonies) do not possess the right to vote. Low-income women in particular may be less
likely or able to vote. Thus, the “political influence” of the group of women who seek abor-
tion is not always easy to discern, and where the group has influence, that influence is not
always brought to bear in ways that will benefit the group’s access to abortion care.
194. McRae, 448 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 342.
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The Carolene footnote was first applied in Graham v. Richardson
to recognize aliens as a suspect classification and strike down two
statutes that denied welfare benefits to non-citizens.197 The Court
later relied on similar factors without referencing Carolene specifi-
cally.198 For instance, in rejecting a claim of poverty as a suspect
classification, the Court wrote in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez:
[T]he class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraor-
dinary protection from the majoritarian political process.199
Presumably, then, a class that could meet criteria such as pur-
posefully unequal treatment or extreme political powerlessness
would qualify for heightened protection. Indeed, Justice Marshall
referred to these same factors in McRae when making the case that
the women affected by the Hyde Amendment were entitled to en-
hanced protections.200 He went on to say:
[W]hile it is now clear that traditional “strict scrutiny” is un-
available to protect the poor against classifications that disfavor
them . . . I do not believe that legislation that imposes a crushing
burden on indigent women can be treated with the same deference
given to legislation distinguishing among business interests.201
Frontiero v. Richardson, in which the Court struck down a sex-
based classification, is another case that implicitly relied on and
197. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372–76 (1971).
198. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(according heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sex); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to recognize poverty as a suspect classi-
fication); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (finding that Mexican Americans
are a suspect classification).
199. 411 U.S. at 28. But cf. Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779,
792–93 (Cal. 1981). There, the California Supreme Court recounted its history of protecting
low-income communities from “statutory mechanisms that restrict the constitutional rights
of the poor more severely than those of the rest of society.” Id. at 796. In doing so, the court
asserted that the indigent poor are often not “adequately protected from discriminatory
treatment by the general safeguards of the legislative process.” Id. Recognizing this truth,
the court found that the state’s abortion coverage restriction violated the equal protection
guarantees of the state constitution. Id. at 793 n.22.
200. McRae, 448 U.S. at 342 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The lower court opinion in McRae
in the Eastern District of New York also found that young, poor women seeking abortion
care were a suspect class. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 738 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
see also Copelon & Law, supra note 188, at 240.
201. McRae, 448 U.S. at 342 (Marshall., J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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possibly expanded the Carolene factors.202 A close reading of Frontiero
reveals five possible factors that are relevant to whether a classifi-
cation is suspect: (1) a history of discrimination; (2) a defining char-
acteristic that bears no relationship to the group members’ ability
to contribute to society; (3) that such a characteristic is immutable;
(4) political powerlessness; and (5) another branch of government
has already recognized such classifications as suspect.203 A federal
district court, ruling on same-sex marriage, noted that the first two
factors were of primary importance.204 Indeed, “[i]mmutability and
lack of political power are not strictly necessary factors to identify
a suspect class.” 205
State courts have already looked to the Carolene factors in as-
sessing whether women constitute a suspect classification and,
consequently, which level of scrutiny should be applied to abortion
funding restrictions.206 Upon examination of the first two factors iden-
tified in Frontiero alone—a history of discrimination and a character-
istic unrelated to societal contributions—a case can be made for the
proposition that heightened scrutiny should be applied to laws that
target women, particularly low-income women, who seek abortions.
a. History of Discrimination
While it is true that, as a general rule, women who have sought
or had abortions have not been subject to discrimination in exercising
their right to vote, pursuing their education, or seeking employment,
they have faced discrimination time and again in their access to health
insurance and health care. Abortion care has been explicitly deemed
unworthy of government subsidization, carved out from private and
public health insurance plans, and subjected to interference with
the doctor-patient relationship far beyond any other health service.
Abortion was not illegal at the founding of the U.S., but it was
banned in most states by the end of the Nineteenth Century.207 Those
bans, however, did not emerge from a sweeping compulsion to protect
the fetus; rather they were largely part of a backlash against efforts
202. 411 U.S. at 690–91.
203. Id. at 684–88.
204. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 987 (S.D. Ohio) (2013).
205. Id. (quoting Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012)).
206. See, e.g., Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 792–93 (Cal.
1981) (stating that the indigent poor share many characteristics of other insular
minorities); N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841, 841 (N.M. 1998)
(discussing the immutability of gender); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1986) (lamenting the long history of discrimination against women).
207. U.S. Abortion History, OUR BODIES OURSELVES (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.our
bodiesourselves.org/health-info/u-s-abortion-history, archived at http://perma.cc/5D49-STWG.
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by women to gain suffrage and access to birth control and thus di-
rectly tied to stereotypes about women and their “natural” role in
society as mothers.208
Once restrictions on abortion were put in place, abortion did not
cease to exist.209 Wealthy women could travel to a country where the
procedure was legal, obtain a clandestine abortion from a legitimate
doctor for a large sum, or take advantage of loopholes in the law.210
But less privileged women were forced to try dangerous home remedies
(such as forcing sharp objects into the uterus) or seek care from un-
trained and often unethical and predatory “back alley abortionists.”211
Countless numbers of women died, were rendered infertile, or
were gravely injured as a result of illegal and unsafe abortions.212 And
all women who sought an illegal abortion were subject to the desper-
ation and indignity that came with having to go outside of the legiti-
mate healthcare system to end an unwanted pregnancy, as well as the
threat of prosecution.213 Nor was that threat insubstantial. Indeed,
prosecutions for performing or procuring illegal abortions were in
process at the time Roe was decided in 1973.214
Once abortion was legalized throughout the country, women in
need of abortion care enjoyed a brief period of time when they could
access that care safely and with relative ease, regardless of their
income level or where they lived.215 But political opponents of abor-
tion, who had lost the fight to recriminalize it, quickly commenced a
strategy to make abortion as difficult as possible to obtain.
As noted above, one of their first strikes was against low-income
women enrolled in Medicaid, passing the Hyde Amendment for the
first time in 1976.216 And it was during this debate that the bill’s spon-
sor, Henry Hyde, acknowledged that he was targeting low-income
women with the legislation precisely because they were the most
208. Id.; see also KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 66–91
(1984) (noting that the criminalization of abortion was also spurred by physicians—who
were in many cases allowed to perform abortions under the criminal statutes—profes-
sionalizing themselves through the burgeoning American Medical Association and at-
tempting to eliminate competition from midwives who were not exempt from the laws
that criminalized abortion).
209. See BOONSTRA ET AL., supra note 187, at 13.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES
THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 22–24 (2010)
(describing deaths and injuries from illegal abortion before Roe).
212. Id. at 23.
213. See BOONSTRA ET AL., supra note 187, at 13.
214. See LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867–1973 225 (1997).
215. HENSHAW ET AL., supra note 134, at 3.
216. See discussion supra Part I.
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politically vulnerable: “I certainly would like to prevent, if I could
legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class
woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle available
is the . . . Medicaid bill.” 217
Encouraged by the success of the Hyde Amendment (including its
validation by the Supreme Court in McRae), the anti-abortion move-
ment went on to pass hundreds (perhaps thousands) of laws against
abortion over the past four decades.218
While many of these laws were initially struck down by federal
and state courts, the majority ultimately were allowed to stand, espe-
cially after Casey formally lessened the standard of review from strict
scrutiny to “undue burden.”219 Indeed, since 2010 alone, 30 states have
passed 205 measures to restrict abortion care.220
Most popular among this recent spate of legislative activity are
Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws.221 Passed
under the pretense of making abortion safer for women, these mea-
sures involve the imposition of unnecessary, arbitrary, and burden-
some standards that have led to a number of clinics shutting down
because they cannot comply with the costly—and often impossible—
requirements.222 Despite the lip service given to women’s health and
safety by these bills’ proponents, the real purpose of these measures
is to close down abortion clinics.223
The most marginalized people—poor women, rural women,
young women, women of color, and immigrant women—bear the
greatest burden of such restrictions. For instance, women in the Rio
Grande Valley in Texas have seen the only two abortion clinics in
the region close their doors as a result of the state’s TRAP laws,
217. Heart of the Matter, supra note 134, at 12 (quoting Henry Hyde).
218. See Arons & Rosenthal, supra note 72.
219. See supra text accompanying note 141.
220. Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions
Puts Providers—And the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, 17 GUTTMACHER POL. REV.
9, 9 (2014).
221. Tara Culp-Ressler, The Dangerous Abortion Restriction That’s Sweeping The
Nation, THINKPROGRESS (July 8, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014
/07/08/3457688/trap-laws-sweep-nation/, archived at http://perma.cc/JRR4-H54R; see also
Amy Allina et al., Pre-Existing Conditions: How Restrictions on Abortion Coverage and
Marginalization of Care Paved the Way for Discriminatory Treatment of Abortion in Health
Reform and Beyond, CENTERWOMENPOLICY.ORG 10–15 (Aug. 2012), http://centerwomen
policy.org/programs/health/statepolicy/documents/REPRO_PreExistingConditions_Allina
-Arons-Barajas-RomanFINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A3AQ-S3HG.
222. Allina et al., supra note 221; see also Boonstra & Nash, supra note 220, at 10.
223. For example, see comments by Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant on a 2012 state
law requiring hospital admitting privileges for providers at the state’s only abortion clinic:
“My goal of course is to shut it down.” Ross Adams, Deadline Day for Jackson Abortion
Clinic, WJTV.COM (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.wjtv.com/story/21270984/deadline-day-for
-jackson-abortion-clinic, archived at http://perma.cc/7FHQ-Z35P.
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leaving them without access to a provider within 240 miles.224 This
area, where more than thirty percent of people live under the fed-
eral poverty level, is home to the largest concentration of low-wage
farmworkers in the country.225 Already cut off from health care gen-
erally (in part because of Texas’s concomitant defunding of family
planning clinics226) and experiencing some of the largest health dis-
parities in the country, these women now face a public health crisis
of monumental proportions.227
With fewer clinics, the additional costs involved in obtaining an
abortion increase as well—in transportation, lodging, time off work
(often unpaid), and child care.228 TRAP laws, especially in combination
with abortion funding and coverage bans like the Hyde Amendment,
render abortion care unaffordable for the women who need it most.229
Just as poll taxes made voting unaffordable for African Americans, so
too is this toxic combination of abortion restrictions putting abortion
care out of reach for the women in this country who are already strug-
gling to get by.230
Many other abortion restrictions, or the justifications for them,
are rooted in stereotypes about women as inherently maternal, and
about abortion as contrary to that maternal instinct.231 Some of these
224. Manny Fernandez, Abortion Law Pushes Texas Clinics to Close Doors, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/us/citing-new-texas-rules-abortion
-provider-is-shutting-last-clinics-in-2-regions.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4398-LQKU.
225. See Martha Hostetter, Profile: Rio Grande Valley ACO Health Providers, COM-
MONWEALTH FUND (June 27, 2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications
/newsletters/quality-matters/2014/June-July/profile-rio-grande-valley#/3, archived at http://
perma.cc/7GS6-Q9XF; CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS & NAT’L LATINA INST. FOR REPROD.
HEALTH, NUESTRA VOZ, NUESTRA SALUD, NUESTRO TEXAS: THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH IN THE RIO GRANDE VALLEY 14–55 (2013), available at http://
reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/NT_SpanishExecSumm
_11-5-13.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K9v-REGB.
226. Kari White et al., Cutting Family Planning in Texas, 367 NEW ENG. J. OF MED.
1179, 1179–81 (2012).
227. CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS & NAT’L LATINA INST. FOR REPROD. HEALTH, supra note
225, at 9.
228. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Timing of Steps and Reasons for Delays in Obtaining
Abortions in the United States, 74 CONTRACEPTION 334, 335, 341–44 (2006).
229. Allina et al., supra note 221, at 11–13.
230. See Planned Parenthood Se. Inc. v. Strange, No. 2:13cv405-MHT, 2014 WL 3809403,
at *47–48 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2014) (imagining how the right to possess a firearm could be
similarly undermined if gun shops were as regulated as abortion clinics).
231. In America, restrictions on abortion have much (although not all) to do
with views on how it is “natural” and appropriate for a woman to respond
to a pregnancy. If the two had little to do with each other, legislatures that
sought to coerce childbirth in the name of protecting life would bend over
backwards to provide material support for the women who are required to
bear—too often alone—the awesome physical, emotional, and financial costs
of pregnancy, childbirth, and childrearing. Only by viewing pregnancy and
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laws require abortion providers to read state-dictated scripts to
women who are contemplating abortion that detail the development
of the fetus, make assertions about when life begins, and make claims
about the nature of the relationship between a woman and her fetus
(much of which is medically inaccurate).232 Others require a woman to
wait a minimum amount of time (usually at least 24 hours) between
an initial abortion consultation and the procedure.233 Still others re-
quire a woman to have an ultrasound and hear a description of the
fetus or view the ultrasound.234 Underlying all of these laws is the
notion that if a woman “really understood what she was doing,” there
is no way she would choose to have an abortion—because doing so is
so counter to her nature. And, like TRAP laws, they all compound the
financial costs of having an abortion, thereby putting the procedure
even more out of reach for low-income women.
Even the Supreme Court has sanctioned discrimination against
women who have abortions based on stereotypes about women’s
nature. Justice Kennedy, for instance, echoed the above sentiment
in validating the federal “Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.” 235 “While
we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems un-
exceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice
to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.” 236
Implicit in his assumption is the idea that women are maternal,
that having an abortion or a particular abortion procedure is anti-
maternal, and that no woman would choose abortion without being
seriously uninformed, misled, or confused.
Compounding the discrimination inherent in these statutes and
case law, women who seek abortions are also stigmatized in popular
culture,237 shamed in their houses of worship,238 and subjected to
motherhood as the natural order of things can a legislature dismiss these
costs as modest in size and private in nature.
Neil S. Siegel, The New Textualism, Progressive Constitutionalism, and Abortion Rights:
A Reply to Jeffrey Rosen, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 55, 65 (2013) (emphasis and citation
omitted).
232. See, e.g., Zita Lazzarini, South Dakota’s Abortion Script—Threatening the
Physician-Patient Relationship, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2189, 2191 (2008).
233. Laura Bassett, Anti-Abortion Laws Take Dramatic Toll on Clinics Nationwide,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 26, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/26
/abortion-clinic-closures_n_3804529.html, archived at http://perma.cc/72N7-25QT; State
Policies in Brief, supra note 12.
234. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(c) (West 2014) (requiring an ultrasound before
a woman can access an abortion and requiring the doctor to describe the fetus’s “anatomical
and physical characteristics”).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2014).
236. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
237. See Alison Norris et al., Abortion Stigma: A Reconceptualization of Constituents,
Causes, and Consequences, 21 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES S49 (2011).
238. See FAITH ALOUD, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2011), available at http://www
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intimidation, stalking, and harassment by “sidewalk counselors.” 239
Moreover, their doctors are threatened daily by violence—several
have even been murdered by zealous anti-abortion advocates.240 These
circumstances are not likely to change soon, given that the Supreme
Court just struck down a Massachusetts law that created a buffer zone
to protect women from harassment when entering an abortion clinic.241
The record is quite clear that there has been a history in this
country of invidious and purposeful discrimination against abortion
services and the women who seek them, with low-income women and
women of color typically as the initial and primary targets and the
ones who are disproportionately affected.
b. No Relationship to an Ability to Contribute to Society
It should be evident that desiring or obtaining an abortion does
not hamper a woman’s ability to contribute to society. Given that fact,
laws that disadvantage women who seek abortions should be sub-
jected to heightened scrutiny.
If anything, not getting the abortion she needs may diminish a
woman’s capacity to make societal contributions.242 Among the most
common reasons women cite for seeking an abortion are a lack of re-
sources to afford a child at that time and the need to care for other
dependents.243 In addition, a woman’s ability to control her fertility
has a clear impact on her potential to complete her education and
participate in the workforce.244
One can presume that for low-income women, these consider-
ations are doubly true. In fact, confirming that women know best
whether or not they can afford to raise a(nother) child, a recent study
found that women who tried to obtain an abortion but could not be-
cause they were too far along in their pregnancy were three times
.faithaloud.org/faith/documents/2011AnnualReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R4EA
-AQ69.
239. See, e.g., Molly Redden, 12 Horror Stories Show Why Wednesday’s Big Supreme
Court Abortion Case Matters, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.motherjones
.com/politics/2014/01/abortion-horror-stories-supreme-court-massachusetts-mccullen
-coakley, archived at http://perma.cc/A7AG-TAQJ (describing how defining some pro-
testers as “sidewalk counselors” glosses over the violence and intimidation tactics of
abortion opponents).
240. Allina et al., supra note 221, at 7–8.
241. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2518, 2535–37 (2014).
242. This is not to suggest that carrying a pregnancy to term would reduce a woman’s
ability to contribute to society. Rather, it is simply to say that women often choose abortion
in response to an unintended or medically complicated pregnancy for reasons that are
highly correlated with their ability to make societal contributions.
243. BOONSTRA ET AL., supra note 187, at 28–29.
244. Jessica Arons & Dorothy Roberts, Sick and Tired: Working Women and Their
Health, in THE SHRIVER REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 133–34 (2009).
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more likely to fall into poverty than women who were able to get the
abortion they sought.245
While the McRae majority failed to address this reality, many
state courts have. The California Supreme Court, for instance, in
striking down its abortion coverage restriction, wrote that a woman’s
ability to choose an abortion is
central to a woman’s control not only of her own body, but also to
the control of her social role and personal destiny. . . . “The impli-
cations of an unwanted child for a woman’s education, employment
opportunities and associational opportunities (often including
marriage opportunities) are of enormous proportion.” 246
In fact, it is perhaps for the very reason that abortion enables
women to pursue educational, financial, and civic opportunities and
otherwise determine the course of their own lives that it triggers
such intense legal and societal discrimination against the women who
have abortions.
2. Animus
Closely related to the question of whether women seeking abor-
tion have been subject to a history of invidious discrimination is the
question of whether restrictions on abortion have been motivated by
animus against the women who seek abortions. For when the Court
has declined to recognize a classification as suspect and apply a
heightened level of scrutiny, it has nevertheless at times struck down
laws under rational review with the reasoning that any law motivated
by animus against a class of people is inherently irrational.247
The first such case of the application of this so-called “rational[]
review with bite” was in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
where the Court refused to recognize the mentally disabled as a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class but still struck down a city ordinance that
would have prohibited the construction of a group home for the
“feebleminded.” 248
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does
not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination.
245. Joshua Lang, Unintentional Motherhood, NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE,
Jun. 16, 2013, at 42L.
246. Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 792–93 (Cal. 1981) (cita-
tion omitted).
247. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
248. 473 U.S. 432, 442–48 (1985).
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To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distin-
guishes between the mentally retarded and others must be ratio-
nally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. This standard,
we believe, affords government the latitude necessary both to pur-
sue policies designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full
potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that
burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner.
The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to
an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbi-
trary or irrational. Furthermore, some objectives—such as “a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”—are not
legitimate state interests.249
The Court pulled that last factor—an intent to disadvantage a
marginalized group—from Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, a
case in which a federal food stamp program was restricted so as to
weed out “hippies.” 250
The legislative history . . . indicates that that amendment was
intended to prevent so-called “hippies” and “hippie communes”
from participating in the food stamp program. The challenged
classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference to this con-
gressional purpose. For if the constitutional conception of “equal
protection of the laws” means anything, it must, at the very least,
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpop-
ular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.251
The Court again applied this concept in Romer v. Evans, where
a state constitutional amendment prohibited any protections from
discrimination based on “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orienta-
tion, conduct, practices or relationships.” 252 The Court found that
“laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected.” 253
Although Romer involved a “status-based enactment divorced
from any factual context” and a “classification of persons undertaken
for its own sake,” 254 and thus might be somewhat distinguishable
from the more specifically drawn class of women who seek abortion
care, the recent case of United States v. Windsor, which struck down
249. Id. at 446–47 (citations omitted).
250. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
251. Id. at 534 (emphasis and citations omitted).
252. 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
253. Id. at 634.
254. Id. at 635.
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Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, may be more apposite.255
In Windsor, Congress denied to same-sex couples “the benefits and
responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their mar-
riages. . . . The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here
in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a
stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by
the unquestioned authority of the States.” 256
Likewise, the “avowed purpose and practical effect” of the Hyde
Amendment are to “impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and
so a stigma” on all pregnant women enrolled in Medicaid who choose
to end rather than continue their pregnancy, just as most laws that
regulate abortion intend to disadvantage and stigmatize abortion
care and the women who seek it.257 As demonstrated above, the Hyde
Amendment is intended as a deterrent for low-income women who
would consider abortion and operates as a punishment for those who
ultimately choose abortion.258
As Justice Marshall declared, “the purpose of the legislation was
to discourage the exercise of [a] fundamental right. In such circum-
stances the Hyde Amendment must be invalidated because it does
not meet even the rational-basis standard of review.” 259
Justice Brennan also equated the law’s malevolent intent with
its irrationality, but in the reverse order:
[T]he congressional decision to fund all medically necessary pro-
cedures except for those that require an abortion is entirely ir-
rational either as a means of allocating health-care resources or
otherwise serving legitimate social welfare goals. And that irra-
tionality in turn exposes the Amendment for what it really is—a
deliberate effort to discourage the exercise of a constitutionally
protected right.260
The punitive nature of the Hyde Amendment is especially appar-
ent when one considers the fact that it denies abortion coverage even
when a pregnancy endangers a woman’s health.261 Justice Marshall
echoed this theme:
255. 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83, 2695–96 (2013).
256. Id. at 2693 (emphasis added).
257. In fact, there is no meaningful distinction between a fetal-interest-furthering law
intended to make abortions harder to obtain and one intended to promote the state’s pref-
erence for childbirth over abortion. The goals are too interrelated and too likely furthered
by the same pieces of legislation. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of
Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 692 (2004).
258. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
259. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 346 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 330 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 350, 352 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also discussion supra Part II.C.
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In these circumstances [of no health exception], I am unable to see
how even a minimally rational legislature could conclude that
the interest in fetal life outweighs the brutal effect of the Hyde
Amendment on indigent women. . . . 
. . . [T]he Government’s interest in protecting fetal life is not
a legitimate one when it is in conflict with “the preservation of
the life or health of the mother,” and . . . the Government’s effort
to make serious health damage to the mother “a more attractive
alternative than abortion[ ]” does not rationally promote the gov-
ernmental interest in encouraging normal childbirth.262
Justice Brennan may have made the point the most forcefully,
finding that the consequence of a
legislative hostility to abortions . . . . is to leave indigent sick
women without treatment simply because of the medical fortuity
that their illness cannot be treated unless their pregnancy is termi-
nated. Antipathy to abortion, in short, has been permitted not only
to ride roughshod over a woman’s constitutional right to terminate
her pregnancy in the fashion she chooses, but also to distort our
Nation’s health-care programs. As a means of delivering health
services, then, the Hyde Amendment is completely irrational.
As a means of preventing abortions, it is concededly rational—
brutally so. But this latter goal is constitutionally forbidden.263
Moreover, Justice Stevens observed that the logic used by the
majority to uphold the denial of abortion coverage to preserve a
woman’s health could be applied equally to allow for restrictions on
abortion coverage even in cases of life endangerment.264 And “that
denial cannot be justified unless government may, in effect, punish
women who want abortions.” 265
However, as noted above, Justice Marshall recognized that
any law designed to discourage the exercise of the abortion right is
irrational—not just those that fail to include adequate protections
to preserve the woman’s health or life.266
It is likewise not a persuasive rebuttal to say that abortion re-
strictions are motivated by animus toward the act of abortion rather
than the women who seek abortions, for there are no abortions with-
out the women who have them. Despite the anti-abortion rhetoric,
women are not the pawns of a heartless “abortion industry.” They
262. Id. at 344–45 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
263. Id. at 330 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 370, 354 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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are morally competent agents making their own decisions about what
is best for their circumstances and determining the course of their
own lives. Indeed, it is likely the volitional nature of choosing to have
an abortion that makes the act transgressive and strikes fear in the
heart of social conservatives. Thus the decision to have an abortion
cannot be disentangled from the women who make those decisions,
and the “legislative hostility to abortions” 267 is steeped in animus for
the women who have them.
3. Intersectional Disparate Impact
For a variety of socioeconomic reasons, poor and low-income
women of color are represented disproportionately among Medicaid
recipients268 and abortion patients.269 This was true at the time McRae
was decided,270 and it is true today. As Justice Marshall pointed out
in his dissent, “The class burdened by the Hyde Amendment consists
of indigent women, a substantial proportion of whom are members of
minority races. . . . [N]onwhite women obtain abortions at nearly dou-
ble the rate of whites.” 271 Today, the disparities have only increased:
African-American women have abortions at almost five times the rate
of white women,272 and Latinas have unintended pregnancies at over
twice the rate of white women.273 Consequently, the Hyde Amendment
267. Id. at 330 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. See Arons & Rosenthal, supra note 72.
In 2011, 40.9 percent of African American females and 36.3 percent of Latinas
had government-based insurance, including 29.2 percent and 29.6 percent
participation, respectively, in Medicaid. In contrast, 32.6 percent of white
females and 24.4 percent of Asian American females got their insurance
through a government program. While Asian and Pacific Islander women
use Medicaid at lower rates for a variety of reasons—only 6 percent were
enrolled in the program in 2004—participation is quite high among various
subgroups. For example, 20 percent of women of Southeast Asian descent are
covered by Medicaid.
Id.
269. In 2008, Black women comprised 30% and Latinas 25% of women who have abor-
tions while representing 13% and 15% of the female population, respectively. Rachel K.
Jones et al., Characteristics of U.S. Abortion Patients, 2008, GUTTMACHER INST. (2010),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/US-Abortion-Patients.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/3C2N-ARSE; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 6. RESIDENT POPULATION BY SEX, RACE, AND
HISPANIC-ORIGIN STATUS: 2000 TO 2009 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/com
pendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0006.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GB8-72BF.
270. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 343 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
271. Id.
272. Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Women of Color: The Bigger Picture, 11 GUTTMACHER
POL. REV. 2, 2 (2008), available at https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/11/3/gpr110302
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TG5E-FBUQ. Reliable data are not available for Native
Americans, Asian Americans, or Pacific Islanders. Id.
273. Id. at 3.
2014] A TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE 51
affects large numbers of women who live at the intersection of various
lines of subordination, including race, gender, and class.
Intersectionality theory, as conceived by Professor Kimberlé
Crenshaw,274 suggests that judicial analysis of discrimination ought
to adapt to identify and invalidate forms of discrimination that are ex-
perienced in a simultaneous and integrative manner. She analogizes
efforts to determine the singular cause of discrimination experienced
by someone living at the intersection of multiple forms of oppression
with efforts to determine the driver responsible for a multi-car acci-
dent at a crossroads:
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and
going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through
an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in
another. If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused
by cars traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes,
from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed because
she is in an intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimi-
nation or race discrimination. . . . But it is not always easy to re-
construct an accident: Sometimes the skid marks and the injuries
simply indicate that they occurred simultaneously, frustrating
efforts to determine which driver caused the harm.275
If the Court were to borrow from Crenshaw’s analysis and in-
vestigate the Hyde Amendment’s disparate impact276 on poor women
of color, taking seriously the intersecting factors of race (suspect),
gender (quasi-suspect), and poverty (not suspect)—and treating them
collectively as a suspect or compound-suspect classification—it would
provide a framework to examine the policy in a manner that is more
274. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242–44 (1991) (discussing
how the intersectionality theory operates).
275. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149 (1989).
276. Thus far, equal protection analysis can proceed only on a claim of disparate
treatment, which requires a showing of a purpose or intent to discriminate. Disparate
impact theory, which does not require intent, is a form of discrimination analysis some-
times used to determine violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. To date, the
Court has not applied disparate impact theory in an equal protection analysis. The last
time the Court considered disparate impact theory under the Equal Protection Clause
was in Washington v. Davis, where the Court held that a law with racially discriminatory
effects—but not purposes—did not violate the Constitution. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
However, the Court has recognized that the discriminatory effects of a policy or practice
can be so pervasive as to evince discriminatory purpose. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 476–77, 482 (1954) (holding that the 100% nonselection of Mexican Americans from
juries was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
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reflective of the complex reasons and ways poor women of color ex-
perience discrimination.277
Instead, Supreme Court jurisprudence has insisted on evaluating
the discriminatory purpose and effect of a statute based on a single
identity or condition and then tends to apply an analysis commensu-
rate with that which falls the lowest in its hierarchy of suspect classi-
fications.278 This practice ignores violations of equal protection that are
based on a group’s multiple, intersecting characteristics.279 In so doing,
the Court fails to accurately identify discriminatory policies that bur-
den some of the most historically disenfranchised populations.
In McRae, the Court did just that by focusing exclusively on the
affected population’s indigent status, which does not trigger height-
ened scrutiny in equal protection analysis,280 and by ignoring race and
gender, the (largely)281 immutable characteristics that do.282 But as
277. For an analysis of intersectional disparate impact theory as applied to African-
American women affected by the Hyde Amendment, see Elizabeth Jones, Looking Back
to Move Forward: An Intersectional Perspective on Harris v. McRae, 1 GEO. J.L. & MOD.
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 379, 380 (2009).
278. To date, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed “intersectional discrimi-
nation,” though lower courts have been much more willing to embrace the concept, often
citing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s guidance. See, e.g., Lam v. Univ.
of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding lower court erred when it treated
the claim of an Asian-American woman in terms of race or sex separately; lower court
should have considered whether discrimination occurred because of the plaintiff’s combined
race and sex); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032–34 (5th
Cir. 1980) (explaining that Title VII prohibits discrimination against African-American
women even if the employer does not discriminate against white women or African-
American men); Kimble v. Wis. Dept. of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 770 (E.D.
Wis. 2010) (“African-American men, like African-American women, may bring intersec-
tional claims.”); Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (recognizing
a sex-plus-age employment discrimination claim under Title VII); see also Intersectional
Discrimination, EEOC COMPL. MAN. §15, IV(c), EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (2011),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/H2YM-AWPD. When the Supreme Court has acknowledged “sex-plus” claims, the cases
typically have involved a characteristic more mutable than gender or race, such as parental
status. See, e.g., Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Sex-Plus Discrimination Claims
Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 51 A.L.R. FED.
2d 341 (2010) (stating that the most cited Supreme Court application of the “sex-plus”
theory is the case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (holding that the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition against sex dis-
crimination does not allow for one hiring policy for women and another for men, each
having preschool-age children).
279. Jones, supra note 277, at 381–82.
280. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–71
(1977)) (“An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within the limited cate-
gory of disadvantaged classes so recognized by our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact
of the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different conclusion. . . . But this
Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of
equal protection analysis.”).
281. We recognize that both race and gender are social constructs and can in some
instances change.
282. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 323. We believe this argument is distinguishable from the
one rejected by the Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello because 1) we are positing an
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Justice Marshall observed, any state action that has such a “ ‘devas-
tating impact on the lives of minority racial groups must be relevant’
for purposes of equal protection analysis.” 283
Unfortunately, when a law disproportionately affects women of
color—and poor women at that—the Court ignores the disparate racial
impact of the law, “downgrades” the standard of review applicable
because it discounts the invidiousness of sex-based classifications,
and then applies rational review based on their indigent status alone.
The result is that, instead of being triply protected, poor women of
color are rendered triply vulnerable. We echo the conclusion to Justice
Marshall’s dissent: “I do not believe that a Constitution committed
to the equal protection of the laws can tolerate this result.” 284
E. Human Rights
As Rhonda Copelon and Sylvia Law (Cora McRae’s lawyers)
chronicled, human rights arguments were not ripe enough to bring
at the time McRae’s case was filed.285 However, in the thirty-four
years since McRae was decided, international human rights law re-
lated to sexual and reproductive rights has developed substantially.
For instance, the United Nations Family Planning Agency (UNFPA)
has observed:
[T]he right to decide freely and responsibly the number and
spacing of . . . children and to have the information, education
and means to do so was first recognized as a human right in
1968. The right to reproductive health has been endorsed and
strengthened in successive international forums, particularly at
the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development
(ICPD) in Cairo as well as at the Fourth World Conference on
Women (Beijing, 1995), the World Summit for Social Develop-
ment (Copenhagen, 1995) and the World Conference on Human
Settlements (Istanbul, 1996). The right to reproductive health
now includes the concept that individuals have the right to at-
tain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health and
to make reproductive choices free from coercion.286
analysis of disparate impact, whereas Geduldig applied disparate treatment theory, and
2) the Hyde Amendment does not exclude pregnancy from covered conditions as the dis-
ability insurance policy in California did. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974).
283. McRae, 448 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 575–76 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
284. Id. at 348 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
285. Copelon & Law, supra note 188, at 223–24.
286. Reproductive Rights, Reproductive Health and Family Planning, UNFPA (Oct. 12,
1999), https://www.unfpa.org/6billion/populationissues/rh.htm, archived at http://perma
.cc/J6L9-6BZE.
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In recent years, the high courts of some countries and regions
have interpreted human rights laws to require affirmative obligations
for their governments to ensure meaningful access to abortion care for
women.287 Additionally, elements of several human rights instruments
to which the U.S. is a party or signatory288 have been interpreted to
apply to the protection, promotion, and fulfillment of reproductive
rights, including abortion, by foreign courts or international bodies.289
Copelon and Law describe the progression of relevant interna-
tional human rights law as follows:
A . . . claim that could be made today but was not yet ripe was
based on international human rights norms. The notion of human
rights as applicable to everyday life rather than to conditions of
dictatorship was in its infancy, and there was no international
movement for women’s human rights. Although even today,
women’s right to abortion is not yet fully established in inter-
national law, abortion to save life and to protect physical and
mental health including in cases of rape and incest and fetal
abnormality is increasingly recognized by international human
rights law. Moreover, in diametrical opposition to the position of
the U.S. Supreme Court in the pregnancy cases, the interna-
tional right to equality for women includes access to health ser-
vices that only women need. And contrary to the negative rights
approach of the U.S. Constitution, nations have not only an obli-
gation to “respect” or not deny or interfere with the exercise of
a fundamental civil right, but also a correlative duty to “ensure”
or facilitate its exercise.290
The domestic framework of negative rights, which only protects
individuals from government interference, often results in rights that
exist on paper but not in practice for many individuals and communi-
ties who do not have the resources necessary to exercise them.291 For
287. Soohoo, supra note 20, at 427–35 (describing decisions by the European Court of
Human Rights, Colombian Constitutional Court, and Nepalese Supreme Court that found
affirmative governmental obligations were required to effectuate the right of women to
access legal abortion).
288. The U.S. is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
is a signatory to both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(though these latter treaties have yet to be ratified by the U.S. Senate). See, e.g., H.R.
Res. 19, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. Res. 582, 111th Cong. (2009). A party to a treaty has a
positive obligation to fulfill the mandates of the treaty. A signatory to a treaty has the
obligation to “refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 18, Apr. 24, 1970, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
289. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS 5–7
(2009), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents
/RRareHR_final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4LVJ-8MM5.
290. Copelon & Law, supra note 188, at 223 (footnotes omitted).
291. Some of the most damaging restrictions on access to contraception and abor-
tion, though, are the financial barriers caused by the denial of public funding.
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example, as this Article makes clear, the legal right to abortion means
little to a Medicaid recipient who cannot afford to have one and is
forced to carry a pregnancy to term. “Liberty guards against govern-
ment intrusion; it does not guarantee social justice.”292
As Professor Cynthia Soohoo detailed in an article advancing a
positive legal framework for abortion funding, recent cases decided
by the high courts of Colombia and Nepal drew on a bevy of human
rights to affirm the right to abortion, paying particular attention to
poor women and the need to secure their access to appropriate medi-
cal care.293 In 2006, the Colombian Constitutional Court declared that
poverty should not keep a woman from obtaining a constitutionally
protected abortion294 and charged its government with eliminating all
obstacles to abortion care in instances where it was protected.295 Three
years later, the Court issued more detailed and prescriptive mandates
about the Colombian government’s obligations to ensure meaningful
access to constitutionally protected abortions.296 Similarly, in 2009, the
Nepalese Supreme Court required its government to take measures
to ensure affordable access to the information and services needed to
procure an abortion to all women regardless of class.297
These international legal norms and obligations are not enough to
win the day with the Court as currently composed, but they merit a
mention in any exploration of McRae’s potential reversal,298 especially
Low-income women cannot afford to exercise the decisional autonomy that
is ostensibly safeguarded by Roe and Casey. A liberty-based equal protection
argument will not likely establish a positive entitlement to government
support of women’s reproductive rights.
Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 EMORY
L.J. 1235, 1301 (2007).
292. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 294.
293. Soohoo, supra note 20, at 428 (“[T]he cases from Colombia and Nepal invoked a
broader range of rights including dignity, liberty and autonomy, health, non-discrimination,
freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, freedom from sexual violence, and
the benefit from scientific progress.”).
294. Id. at 429–31 (discussing Corte Constitucional [C.C.], Mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia
C-355/06 (Colom.) Translation at 51–57). The Colombian Supreme Court decriminalized
abortion in specific circumstances: when a woman’s life or health is threatened, when the
pregnancy results from rape or incest, and when an anomaly renders the fetus non-
viable. Id. at 430.
295. Id. at 430–31. This ruling stands in stark contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
statement that while the U.S. government may not place obstacles in a woman’s path to
abortion, it need not remove those not of its creation. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
317–18 (1980).
296. Soohoo, supra note 20, at 431–32 (discussing Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Consti-
tutional Court], Mayo 28, 2009, Sentencia T-388/09 (Colom.)).
297. Id. at 432–34 (discussing Lakshmi Dhikta v. Nepal, Supreme Court of Nepal 2009,
6). Like the Colombian Supreme Court, the Nepalese Supreme Court stated women should
not be denied abortion due to an inability to pay. The Court even suggested the Nepalese
government consider capping fees and providing free services. Id.
298. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Transnational Law as a Domestic Resource: Thoughts
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considering the Court’s acknowledgment, albeit limited, of inter-
national legal trends in other constitutional settings.299 Although the
U.S. is not bound by other countries’ jurisprudence, nor do its courts
typically include international standards in their legal reasoning, as a
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
U.S. government “has an obligation to protect, promote, and fulfill
women’s rights to physical integrity and equality under the law,
without discrimination.” 300 And insurance coverage bans on abortion
undermine that obligation.301
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the above arguments, it is our hope that the
reader is as incensed as we are by the many injustices wrought by
Harris v. McRae. Whether one considers the majority’s callous dis-
regard for the real-life impact of the Hyde Amendment on low-income
women and their families, the speed and dismissiveness with which
the Court retreated from Roe, or the multiple violations of estab-
lished doctrine the ruling condoned, it ought to be clear that the
McRae decision utterly failed to live up to the principles embodied
by our Constitution. 
There are many legal arguments that could be further devel-
oped to challenge conventional legal thinking about public insurance
coverage of abortion and, eventually, prompt the Supreme Court to
revisit its holding in McRae. We summarize the ones we have ex-
plored here: First, the Court ignored Congress’s obligation to govern
impartially, allowed Congress to coerce women into continuing un-
intended or compromised pregnancies through selective disbursement
of funds, and permitted Congress to unconstitutionally condition the
receipt of Medicaid benefits on the relinquishment of a fundamental
right. Second, the Court applied an erroneously low level of review to
the encumbrance of the fundamental right to choose abortion. Third,
the Court reversed its own balancing test, prioritizing the state’s in-
terest in the potential life of the fetus over an interest in the woman’s
health. Fourth, the Court failed to recognize the population affected
on the Case of Women’s Rights, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 689, 701–04 (2003) (describing the
importance of transnational law for the attainment of women’s rights).
299. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing a decision from the
European Court of Human Rights as persuasive authority).
300. Marianne Mollman & Meghan Rhoad, Letter to US Senate: Reject Abortion Cover-
age Restrictions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009
/11/19/letter-us-senate-reject-abortion-coverage-restrictions, archived at http://perma.cc
/UUY5-67PD.
301. Id.
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by the Hyde Amendment as a suspect class deserving heightened scru-
tiny, that the animus motivating the Hyde Amendment’s abortion-
funding ban renders it irrational, and that it has a disparate impact
on poor women of color. Finally, the Court ought to apply human
rights norms to prescribe affirmative governmental obligations, in-
cluding insurance coverage and funding, to ensure all people’s access
to abortion care. In short, we have laid out many—though perhaps
not all—of the reasons the McRae decision was and continues to be
constitutionally infirm.
This collection of arguments is not meant to be exhaustive in
scope or depth, nor is it primed for immediate application. These argu-
ments (and others not discussed herein) require further investigation
and conversation, as well as doctrinal development, in order to be used
to maximum effect in active cases and controversies. In the meantime,
it is imperative to continue to make the case in both scholarship and
litigation for the funding and coverage of abortion care in order to
challenge existing assumptions and shift legal thinking on the topic.
We also recognize that the current Supreme Court and much of
the federal bench are by no means sympathetic to the above argu-
ments. Success ultimately will depend on a receptive judiciary, which
requires the confirmation of judges who will adhere to the high stan-
dards of the Court’s original articulation of the right to abortion and
who will assess the tangible effects of abortion restrictions on the
most disadvantaged members of society.
The McRae decision has allowed the Hyde Amendment to deny
poor women dignity and justice for far too long. But overturning
McRae and declaring the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional is not
only needed to secure the abortion rights of low-income women; it is
the condition precedent for protecting the rights of all women. As we
have seen, the proponents of the Hyde Amendment first targeted
women enrolled in Medicaid but quickly turned to other populations
of women. By the same token, the Court first loosened the Roe stan-
dard in the funding cases before lowering its scrutiny for other types
of abortion restrictions. Thus, safeguarding the rights of the most
powerless in our society is both a moral imperative and the best way
to maintain the integrity of our Constitution.
It is far past time to “rethink[ ] the meaning of liberty so that it
protects all citizens equally.” 302 By imagining what is possible, we
create the potential, twenty years from now, for the government to
meet its obligations to protect and ensure the rights of all women,
regardless of their income.
302. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 294.
